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                                  ABSTRACT 
 
Since the colonial period, Zimbabwe has been a territory characterised by contestation. In the 
2000s, Zimbabwe entered a period of severe socio-economic conditions; this period was also 
marred with several cases of human rights abuses and political violence. This period also saw 
the emergence of a new opposition party, the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC). In the 
mid-2000s, South Africa was vested with the task of resolving the political crisis in Zimbabwe by 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC).  Former South African President Thabo 
Mbeki managed to facilitate a Global Political Agreement (GPA), which was signed on 15 
September 2008. This led to an Inclusive Government (IG) being formed on 3 February 2009. 
The IG brought the three main opposition parties in Zimbabwe into a power-sharing 
government with the Zanu-PF.  This dissertation explores the role played by South Africa in 
brokering a power-sharing deal in Zimbabwe, it also assesses whether “power-sharing” is an 
effective peace-building model. At the core of this dissertation is an assessment of the impact 
of the IG on the politics in Zimbabwe. Three themes are used to assess the politics, namely 
socio-economics in Zimbabwe, the rule of law in Zimbabwe and the perceived legitimacy of the 
government. The dissertation uses content analysis as the research method to analyse three 
newspapers, a South African newspaper, the Mail & Guardian and two Zimbabwean 
newspapers, the Sunday Mail and the Standard Newspaper. The period of analysis will be from 
2005 to 2011. The dissertation offers a substantive analysis of the reporting of the three 
newspapers. The findings of this dissertation reveal that the socio-economic situation in 
Zimbabwe has improved since the implementation of the IG but is still in a dire situation. It also 
reveals that, despite the decrease in reports of human rights abuses and the cases of political 
violence, Zimbabwe is still devoid of the rule of law. It reveals that the legitimacy of the 
government is in Zimbabwe has slight improved since the implementation of the IG. The 
dissertation offers recommendations to the political crisis in Zimbabwe from the discipline of 
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                                      Chapter One 
                                      Introduction 
1.1. General Overview & Significance of Study 
This study explores the impact of the Inclusive Government (IG) on the political situation in 
Zimbabwe after its implementation on 13 February 2009, following the signing of the Global 
Political Agreement (GPA) on 9 September 2008. This new government saw the ruling party 
Zanu-PF leader Robert Mugabe enter into a coalition government with the two main opposition 
leaders Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Author Mutambara (MDC-M). The IG was put in place 
as a desperate measure to break the political deadlock that followed the March 2008 elections 
and to help the country recover from economic impasse (Chigora and Guzura, 2011). 
The problem which faces Zimbabwe is that cases of violence are still prevalent two years after 
the implementation of the IG. The power-sharing government was formed as a desperate 
measure to end the post-election violence but there are still reports of conflict and victims of 
violence and intimidation across the country. The rule of law still doesn’t exist in Zimbabwe and 
the IG seems to have failed to convince the international community to remove sanctions 
against Zimbabwe (Chigora and Guzura, 2011).   
There has been much speculation concerning the success of the power-sharing government, 
some newspaper reports propose that it is working while others propose that it is failing. One 
of the objectives of the dissertation is to bring conclusion to the above speculation. The main 
aim of the current research is to examine the impact of the IG on politics in Zimbabwe after 
2005. It will enquire whether it has improved the political situation of the country as was 
intended.  
The findings of such a research may be used by other countries with internal conflicts and can 
also add knowledge to conflict resolution scholarship. It can be used by Zimbabwean policy 
makers and the IG stakeholders to assess whether or not the current IG needs revision.  The 
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findings can also be used by foreign investors to determine whether the level of political 
instability will affect their business investments.  
This topic is important because it deals with a current issue; it is important not only for 
Zimbabwe but also for the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) goal which is to 
make Southern Africa a peace zone region (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995, p.161).  
In addition this topic will enquire into how the IG has affected the political situation and 
whether it has brought positive change or not.  It will answer the question of whether the 
implementation of the IG represents a successful conflict resolution strategy. This will be 
discussed in chapter four. 
 The current research provides a reliable and replicable count of the cases of rights abuses and 
political violence reported in the media since the formation of the Inclusive Government by 
counting the number of variables related to the political situation from the period 2005 to 
2011. In addition it offers a comparative study of three different newspapers which yields more 
reliability. 
Chapter one will provide the introduction of the dissertation, a general overview of the 
dissertation, the significance and the rational for the study and the literature review.  
Chapter two provides a background to the political situation of Zimbabwe. This chapter aims at 
arguing that Zimbabwean territory has had a long history of political contestation. It will show 
contestations which took place in the history of Zimbabwe, dating back from the pre-colonial 
period to the early 1990s. 
Chapter three will describe Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political situation from the mid 
1990s to the formation of the IG in February 2009. It will focus on the economic crisis, the 
repression by the ruling government and the events which took place prior to the signing of the 
Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008.  
Chapter four will discuss why a power-sharing model was the ideal peace building strategy for 
the political crisis in Zimbabwe. It will also discuss South Africa’s foreign policy towards 
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Zimbabwe and “sanctions” as a conflict resolution strategy along with their failure to oust 
Mugabe’s regime. Lastly it will discuss the reason for the continuing political tension in 
Zimbabwe after the formation of the Inclusive Government (IG). 
Chapter five comprises the Research Design, Findings and Analysis. It provides the data 
collection method, the research results and the analysis of the research results. It uses the 
research findings to determine the impact of the IG on the three clusters the rule of law, socio-
economics and the perceived legitimacy of the government in Zimbabwe.  
Chapter six comprises of a discussion on possible solutions to the crisis in Zimbabwe, and will 
highlight the lessons learned, the limitation of the dissertation and provides the conclusion of 
the dissertation. 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
Matyszak (2009), in “Power Dynamics in Zimbabwe’s Inclusive Government” talks of how Zanu-
PF has been breaking the Inclusive Government (IG) rules by appointing ministers without the 
consent of the MDC. A lot of research has dealt with the internal politics of the Inclusive 
Government, particularly on the power structures within the IG and little research exists on the 
political situation in Zimbabwe after the IG, which is a reason for why the current research is 
needed (Lyons, 2002).  
Wellington Radu (2010) has undertaken similar research in “Zimbabwe in the Media: The 
coverage of the talks about the Zimbabwean Unity Government in the Mail & Guardian, 2007-
2009”. The similarity is that Radu (2010) uses the same primary source for data collection, the 
Mail & Guardian newspaper. In contrast his dissertation focuses on the negotiations between 
party elites while this dissertation will focus on a lot more political features other than the 
negotiations in Zimbabwe. 
Previous research by Mapuva (2010) explains how “government power-sharing” has grown 
popular in places where there are ethnic, tribal and political conflicts. In this paper Mapuva 
(2010) proposes that the Inclusive Government in Zimbabwe has failed and puts the blame on 
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Robert Mugabe’s exploitation of power, while the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 
Kenya has been a success story. This dissertation aims to ascertain Mapuva’s claim as whether 
or not Mugabe is to blame for the failure of the IG. Such a conclusion will achieved by counting 
all the negative reports associated with Mugabe and his party affiliates. 
Mapuva (2010) further argues that a power-sharing government in general deprives people of 
their right to elect their political leaders of choice, which is a right enshrined under the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Mapuva, 2010). This claim by Mapuva (2010) is very 
interesting and cannot be ignored as its examination will bring a more comprehensive 
conclusion to the merits of “power-sharing” models in Africa. A synthesis of the latter will be 
discussed in the dissertation.  
Govea (1998) argues that the presence of violence during a transitional government is a clear 
indication that institutionalization has not taken place. Institutionalization is a term given to a 
successful transition with the non-existence of factors which lead to a political crisis, (e.g 
violence, riots, strikes, repressive laws, abduction of political figures). He also defines a 
“political crisis” as a set of conditions that jeopardizes the regime’s ability to govern the country 
(Govea, 1998, p.138). Govea’s article is important for this dissertation because it provides 
definitions which are paramount to this research. 
Gonzalez (2008) suggests that a political crisis may be triggered by a presidential resignation or 
when the sacking or dissolution of parliament takes place with a dubious legality and is inclusive 
of attempts to promote crisis, for example through coups (successful or failed). It may include a 
situation where the status quo stays in power through dubious ways, such as election rigging or 
opposition intimidation (Gonzalez, 2008). In comparison to Govea (1998), Gonzalez focuses on 
one factor which amounts to a political crisis, while Govea (1998) discusses many other factors 
which trigger a political crisis. 
Gonzalez (2008) and Gonvea (1998) write on themes and factors which make up the variables 
for determining a political situation. The latter also argues that any other factors which may 
jeopardize a political situation should be considered in any analysis. Hence the themes  that will 
be used by the researcher to examine the political crisis in Zimbabwe are human rights abuses, 
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civil unrest, number of strikes, riots, arrests, hospital cases, instances where the police are 
used, the use of military force on intervening conflict or on controlling riots/strikes, the 
implementation of repressive laws, corruption, socio-economic incidents, cash crisis, 
victimization  of media agents and the unconstitutional appointments of government 
executives (Gonzalez, 2008; Gonvea, 1998). 
Gadzikwa (2009) conducted a study in which he used a similar research methodology to the 
current study; although his dissertation was titled “Online Media & Democracy:  A critical 
analysis of the role played by Zimbabwe’s online English Newspapers in the run-up elections to 
2008 elections”.  This study analysed 22 Zimbabwean online news papers through “content 
analysis”, a research technique which forms the basis of this dissertation. The newspapers were 
both weekly and daily. Although Gadzikwa (2009) focused more on the website online 
interactive tools than the news content reported, he uses a similar research methodology. 
Gadzikwa says that “due to changeability of online journalism the coding scheme was left open 
for unexpected interactive options”, a trait which is common in content analysis, where the 
researcher allows new themes in the coding scheme to introduce themselves in the course of 
inquiry. The strength of the latter method is that it allows the researcher to obtain specific 
information on newly encountered information as the findings are pre-determined in content 
analysis (Webber, 1990). 
 
1.3. Research Design 
The research will be in the form of a desktop study, which will only incorporate secondary data. 
A mixed research methodology will be used. The early stages of the data inquiry resemble a 
quantitative analysis but later a qualitative method will be used to bring meaning to the 
research findings. The advantage of using a mixed methodology is that while quantitative 
enquiry emphasizes on measurements, it also helps in analyzing the relationships between 
variables. Qualitative research helps to answer the questions that explain how social 




The aim of this study is to examine the impact of the Inclusive Government (IG) on the politics 
of Zimbabwe. It was deemed appropriate to use media which specializes in the surveillance of 
politics of Zimbabwe, hence the use of newspaper publications as a primary. Content analysis 
will be the data collection technique used. Content analysis is an established data technique for 
analyzing texts e.g newspapers and magazines (Harwood and Gary, 2003).  It has become an 
established technique in many mainstream fields like sociology, medicine, psychology and 
journalism (Neuudorf, 2002). Newspapers are made up of words and texts, and content analysis 
is an ideal technique for analyzing the latter.  Webb (1981) adds that the strength of content 
analysis is that it is capable of analysing the duration and frequency of a phenomenon for 
example of a word, phrase, story, sentence, paragraph or issues. 
It is important to note that content analysis is dependent on the consistency of the method of 
selection employed. What is included and what is excluded must be consistent throughout the 
whole research so as to ensure that it is replicable, which is most important in ensuring that the 
research is scientific. If there is no consistency there is a risk of researcher bias, namely that at 
times the researcher will tend unconsciously to select material which only supports their 
hypothesis (Elo and Kyngas, 2007, p.3).  
Content analysis has also been praised for being an objective technique (Krippendorf, 1980; 
Sandelowski, 1995; Berelson, 1952). Critics of content analysis say its limitations are that it 
concentrates more on the quantification of data instead of the meaning of data. The latter 
critique is arguably dependent up on the aims of the researcher. Krippenorf (1980) suggests 
that to avoid subjectivity when conducting the research, an allowance for the emergence of 
new themes or categories from the data must be allowed so as to maintain objectivity.  
Three weekly newspapers were selected as the sample for this research. Two Zimbabwean 
publications were used, one a pro-MDC newspaper “The Standard News” and the other a state 
owned pro-Zanu-PF newspaper “The Sunday Mail”.  The news archives in the newspaper 
websites were used as the source of information for this dissertation. “The Standard News” 
archives dated back to 2005, while the Sunday Mail had archives only dating back to 2009. This 
was one of the challenges faced during this research. The choice of using two different 
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newspapers with visible distinction in political party affiliation was taken to avoid bias. A third 
newspaper was used to assure neutrality, a South African Newspaper entitled “the Mail & 
Guardian” (M&G).The M&G website will also be used as the main source of data collection. The 
analysis of the Standard News and the M&G newspapers will be taken as from the year 2005 
while the Sunday Mail dates from 2009. 
A criterion of geographic coverage, prominence, political affiliation, popularity, and online 
accessibility was used to select the three newspapers. The researcher had to consider each 
newspaper’s geographic coverage before selection. The Standard News and the Sunday Mail 
cover news nationally around Zimbabwe, while the M&G frequently covers stories in 
neighboring Southern African countries, particularly in Zimbabwe as compared to the extent of 
other publications in South Africa. The popularity of the publications makes the newspapers 
more significant.  According to the M&G website, the M&G is accessed by over 625 000 readers 
online, while according to the Zimbabwe All Media and Products Survey (Zamps) in 2012, the 
Sunday Mail is the leading weekly newspaper in Zimbabwe with over 1 120 000 readers a week 
and the Standard News is the most popular weekly publication which is privately owned. 
2005 was chosen be the start of year for enquiry, because of its amount of significance. It was 
the year in which President Mugabe signed a constitutional amendment which nationalized all 
the land in Zimbabwe and turned all ownership into leases. It is also the year in which the MDC 
split into two factions (Ranger, 2004).  
The length of enquiry stretches for seven years 2005-2011. Babbie (1998) says that content 
analysis provides for the study of a phenomenon over long periods of time. It is ideal to 
analysing a trend in a society; hence it is appropriate for this research as it aims to enquire into 
the political “situation” or trend in Zimbabwe since the implementation of the IG. It was also 
the year in which the news archives on two of the websites dated back to. 
Each newspaper report would be read, analysed and a number which represents the category 
of the meaning of that news report would be assigned to that specific report. For example, see 
Table 1 – The Sunday Mail reports. For each of the newspaper articles there is a number in 
brackets at the end of the report. For example the news report titled “Water situation remains 
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critical” was assigned to number 17 because this number represents Socio-economic incidents. 
Example 2. below shows the news report titled “PSC audit verification begins” has 26 assigned 
to it because this category represents Government development initiatives/projects 
Table 1 - The Sunday Mail Newspaper reports: example 
 Title of Article Date Category Code 
Example 1 Water situation 
remains critical 
27 October 2011 Socio-economic 
incidents 
17 
Example 2 PSC audit verification 
begins’ 




Note: For a more detailed monthly coding scheme with frequency of categories for a 
hypothetical newspaper, kindly refer to Appendix 2. 
Initially, the archives of the Zimbabwean Monthly Economic Review by the African 
Development Bank (AFDB) were meant to be analyzed, but given difficulties accessing the 
archives, a category titled “Socio-economic improvements” has been added to substitute for 
this in order to explore the relationship between economic growth and political violence in 
Zimbabwe.  
At the core of the investigation is an attempt to explore: 
 the number of human rights abuses in Zimbabwe; politically motivated violence; the 
number of hospital cases motivated by political affiliation; the number of abductions and 
assassination of political party members. 
 the use of police or military to stop strikes and riots since the formation of the IG. 
 the number of cases where political party elites bad-mouth each other in public addresses. 
  the extent of the use of repressive laws   
  the effectiveness of a power-sharing model as  a conflict resolution strategy. 
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 whether the Zimbabwean climate is ready to have free and fair elections. 
  the impact of economic growth on human rights abuses, riots, strikes, political tension and 
to explore whether the IG has detracted from the civil society in Zimbabwe. 
The initial research objectives of this study were limited to eleven distinct categories;  Political 
Violence, Human Rights Abuses, Politically motivated arrests, Abductions, Riots, Use of the 
Military against civilians, Strikes, Bad Mouthing amongst politicians, Repressive laws and 
Formation of Civil Society. The categories were later expanded substantially (to 50 in total), on 
account of the extensive frequency of themes which emerged while analysing the newspapers. 
The extra categories added were too significant to be ignored and all affected the political 


















                                   Chapter Two 
A Timeline of Historical Contestation in Zimbabwe 
2.1. Pre-European Contestation 1250s-1880s 
The territory of Zimbabwe has a long history of contestation which dates back to the 1200s. 
Between 1250 and 1629 the territory known as Zimbabwe was ruled by the Rozwi Empire. In 
the 1600s the Portuguese explorers arrived in Zimbabwe to spread Christianity and trade 
minerals with the Rozwi empire. The first contestation in Zimbabwe was between the Rozwi 
Empire and the Portuguese explorers. The Portuguese staged a series of wars with the Rozwi 
Empire but were defeated. Even though the Rozwi empire managed to win the war, the series 
of wars staged left the Rozwi Empire in near collapse. There are many factors which prompted 
contestation in Zimbabwe; ethnic, racial, regional and political differences are the most notable 
(Moore, 2005). 
Zimbabwe was contested again in the 1800s with the arrival of the Ndebele people who had 
migrated from South Africa. The Ndebele used King Shaka’s military tactics to dominate other 
African groups, the Rozwi and the Shona people were the victims. The Ndebele forced the 
Shona and the Rozwi people to pay tribute in the form of livestock, particularly cattle and 
beads. This extortion was a form of slavery and capitalist exploitation. Most literature has 
shown how Africa has been colonized by Europeans and little has been written on how African 
locals have regarded other African locals to be less superior, particularly on the basis of ethnic 
disparity. This is very interesting because it dismisses the notion that white Europeans were the 
only colonizers in Africa. This brings to light that colonisation and slavery did not only begin 
when Europeans arrived to Africa, but existed within African society years before Europeans 





2.2. The 1820s: the arrival of Cecil Rhodes and European 
Contestation  
Contestation of the Zimbabwean territory continued right through the 1820s when the British 
came to Southern Africa under the leadership of Cecil John Rhodes. The history of this conflict 
was based on exploitation and racism, with Africans being the victims. Conflict between 
Africans and the British came to shape the history of Zimbabwe, dating to the present day, as 
will be shown in the following chapter (Mitchell, 1990). The difference between conflict in the 
colonial period and post-colonial period is that during the colonial period the whites were the 
instigators while now, it is the Africans. 
Cecil John Rhodes officially made Zimbabwe a colony of Britain when his company the ‘British 
South Africa Company’ received a royal charter from the Queen Victoria of England, which 
granted him permission to start mining operations in Zimbabwe. In return Rhodes presented to 
Queen Victoria the concession signed by King Lobengula of the Ndebele ethnic group of 
Zimbabwe which gave him mining rights in the country. This concession signed by Lobengula 
and Rhodes is known as the “Rudd Concession” (Mitchell, 1990).  
The Rudd concession gave the British the liberty to exploit the territory of Zimbabwe. After 
taking over the land, the British forced the Ndebele into slavery. The British spread north of 
Zimbabwe, where the Shona people were forcibly put under their rule. This is how the British 
came to colonize the territory of Zimbabwe and this rule continued for the next 90 years. Under 
the British colony Zimbabwe was known as Southern Rhodesia and Zambia as Northern 
Rhodesia, a name which was officially adopted in 1895 in honor of Cecil John Rhodes (Chitiyo 
and Rupiya, 2007). This period is remembered as a time of racial, political, social and economic 
marginalization of the African natives in Zimbabwe (Mitchell, 1990). 
The conflict between the British and the African natives in Zimbabwe occurred because the 
British  dispossessed Africans of fertile land and forced them to settle on rocky land upon which 
crop productivity was unlikely; robbed Africans of their cattle, minerals and forcibly made them 
laborers on the farms and mines (Mitchell, 1990). This marginalization by the British shaped the 
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history of the Africans and the British conflict in Zimbabwe over the years until 1980 when 
Zimbabwe gained its independence (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2007). 
 
2.3.   The Chimurenga Contestations 1896-1960s: The 
unsuccessful Ndebele & Shona revolt   
The continuous marginalization and exploitation upset the local Africans to the point where 
they staged an uprising against the British. The first contestation between Zimbabweans and 
the British was in 1896 in form of a failed revolt by the Ndebele and Shona against the British. 
This contestation is known as the “First Chimurenga” or the “the Second Matebele War”, the 
revolt began in March 1986 in Matabeland and the Shona later joined it in June 1986. This 
revolt was similar to the conflict with the Portuguese in 1600s because the exploitation of 
minerals was a reason for the conflict the difference being that slavery was key issue being 
fought over here. The term “Chimurenga’’ would again be used to refer to another staged 
revolt against colonial rule by the Shona in Zimbabwe as will be shown in the following chapters 
(Ranger, 2004). 
Despite the continued oppression and the exploitation of African locals, Zimbabwe did not have 
any significant contestation in the period from 1896 to the mid 1950s. During this period the 
British government enacted policies which were aimed at derailing the African culture such as 
the abolishment of the payment of marriage and the Tax Ordinance of 1901 which penalized 
any polygamous marriages (Phimister, 1988).   
In the 1920s there was no major contestation in Zimbabwe, the protests which were staged 
were insignificant. If anything, the conflicts staged were done so with the utmost 
acknowledgement that the British determined the status quo. For example there were district 
reports which showed that there was a risk of trained and educated natives who were keen on 
raising African consciousness to Africans, these educated natives formed organisations which 
stirred up popular discontent with British rule because of the former’s disregard for African 
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customs, the organisations were the South African National Congress and the Ndebele National 
Home Movement respectively (Phimister, 1988, p.159).  
The British spent the early years of the 1900s domesticating the natives and instilling the British 
culture and education system in local society. During this time the British did not face any 
significant revolts which compromised their standpoint as the status quo until the 1950s as 
explained earlier (Ranger, 2007). 
 
 
2.4. African Resistance and the formation from the African 
National Congress (ANC) to the National Democratic Party 
(NDP) 
Joshua Nkomo’s political career began when he went to study in South Africa, where he met 
Nelson Mandela and other regional nationalist leaders at the University of Fort Hare. Upon his 
return to Zimbabwe he became a trade unionist for the black railway workers and during this 
period he rose to become the leader of the Railway Workers Union (RWU). He continued his 
trade union work until he entered politics through the African National Congress (ANC) in 1952 
(Nkomo, 1984). 
Joshua Nkomo soon rose to prominence on the political scene in 1957 as the leader of the new 
ANC through its merger in Bulawayo which was known as the Southern Rhodesian African 
National Congress with its Youth league based in Salisbury. The Southern African National 
Congress and the Salisbury based Youth league triggered many widespread African resistance 
movements which were a retaliation to the growing unemployment of  Africans and the 
worsening conditions of living standards at the time in Rhodesia (Gwisai, 2002). These 




In response to the increasing African resistance, the British government used repressive laws to 
deny the Africans from protesting. The ‘’1959 Unlawful Organization Act’’ was a strategy to 
destroy any African aspiration of independence. Under it more than 1500 Africans were 
prosecuted and 1002 convicted between 1960 and 1965. This was evidence of the growing 
African political consciousness through nationalism and the frustration of the white Rhodesian 
electorate was proof that majority rule would soon shift towards the Africans in Rhodesia 
(Esterhuysen, 2004). 
 In January 1960, the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed and Joshua Nkomo became 
its President. Later in the 1950s the African labour unions used the NDP as an organization to 
showcase political consciousness to protest against the British regime, it mainly fought for 
service delivery issues such as higher wages, better housing and education for Africans. It also 
aimed for the abolishment of oppressive and segregating reforms such as the Land 
Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Husbandry Act 1951 and petitioned  for the ‘’one-
person one-vote’’ policy. Despite facing state repression which included the arrest of some of 
its members the NDP grew significantly , it attracted supporters from all over Rhodesia  and by 
June 1961 the NDP had 250 000 registered members (Machigaidze, 1991). 
 
 
2.5. The Formation of ZAPU and the breakaway party ZANU 
The NDP was eventually banned by the British government in 1960 but re-emerged onto the 
political scene in 1961 with a new name, “the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union” (ZAPU) (Moyo 
and Ashurst, 2007, p.39).  After two years of operation, in 1963 ZAPU suffered internal 
differences which forced it to split up, the reasons for the split were regionally and ethnically 
motivated. ZAPU at the time was made up of African locals from two main regions in Rhodesia, 
Matabeleland and Mashonaland whose respective native groups. It is said that ZAPU also split 
over a decision on the execution of protests against the colonial government (Moyo and 
Ashurst, 2007).   
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A breakaway party called the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed; it was 
largely made up of the Shona ethnic group, the majority of which was located in the 
Mashonaland region. With the 1963 split, ZANU went on to form its own military wing known 
as the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and ZAPU formed the Zimbabwean 
People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). This split would not be the last time a nationalist political 
party would split over regional, ethnic and strategy differences in Zimbabwe.  A similar split 
would feature again in mid 2000s (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2007), as will be shown in the following 
chapters.  
The new breakaway party ZANU continued to grow in popularity as it drew supporters not only 
from the Mashonaland region, but also the Manicaland region which was located in the east of 
Southern Rhodesia (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2007, p.56).  
 
2.6.   The 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence:  Britain 
vs Colonial government  
 In the 1960s, as most African countries were being granted independence, Southern Rhodesia 
and South Africa were the only countries which still had draconian regimes, characterized by 
prevalent racial segregation, racial exploitation and racial exclusion. For example, in Southern 
Rhodesia only 400 people (all white) were eligible to vote excluding the majority of the 
country’s population, 2, 3 million Africans. The proportion of black to white in South Africa was 
5 to 1 while in Southern Rhodesia it was 24 to 1. A very small white minority was ruling 
Southern Rhodesia; democracy did not exist there as the government was not a representation 
of the people. Rhodesia received a lot of criticism from the international community (Dias, 
1967). 
In 1965, Zimbabwe while still known as Southern Rhodesia was contested yet again. This 
contestation was the first of its kind in the territory of Zimbabwe because it was the first time 
the British government received pressure to abolish their colonial and racially oppressive 
structures. Around this time, Britain was planning to revolutionize Southern Rhodesia and make 
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it a multi-racial democracy.  Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia issued a Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965 which meant that Southern Rhodesia 
was no longer obliged or considered as an entity of Britain, implying that the Rhodesia was now 
a sovereign state. The UDI had not received any endorsement from Britain; therefore this 
caused conflict between the Rhodesian government and Britain (Dias, 1967, p.6).  
The issuing of the UDI was unilateral and fundamentally unlawful since the UDI could only be 
authorized by Britain. The UDI could have been lawful if it was an internal decision endorsed by 
Britain. For example in the American War of Independence, Britain officially accepted the 
secession and independence of America as a sovereign state (Lloyd, 1995). In response to the 
UDI, Britain called for international sanctions against the Smith regime (Dias, 1967, p.6). 
 
2.7. 1966 Contestation:  The Second Chimurenga 
In the 1960s Zimbabwe was contested again in a similar revolt like the one staged in 1896 by 
the Ndebele and Shona against the British. In this revolt other groups of people residing in 
Zimbabwe participated in this revolt, notably the Kalanga, Venda and the Tonga (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2009, p.102). The revolt was a response by the native political movements who were 
angered over the arrests and the detention of many African nationalist leaders, including 
Joshua Nkomo. The battle took place in 1966 in a small town called Chinhoyi, which is near the 
capital of Southern Rhodesia, Salisbury. The ZANU military wing “ZANLA” was used to 
spearhead this contestation (Beckett, 2002).  
This contestation is known as the “Second Chimurenga” by the liberation movement. This name 
served to remind the liberation soldiers and activists of the first revolt staged against the British 
in 1986. It was a patriotic rhetoric used to motivate the liberation activists. The term 
Chimurenga was also used to legitimize the land invasions in 2000 and continues to be used the 





 2.8.   Sanctions after the UDI  
The first sanctions against the Smith government were imposed on 3 December 1965 where 
Britain suspended the Governor and the directors of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia and froze all 
the Rhodesian reserves in Britain. Britain further banned oil transportation to Rhodesia as it 
was concerned with stamping out racism through majority rule government. On 20 December 
1966 Britain made it clear at the House of Commons that the UDI in Rhodesia could never be 
accepted until there was majority African rule (Dias, 1967). 
The UDI was eventually put to an end in November 1969 after a series of negotiations between 
the three parties, namely Britain, Rhodesia and the African nationalist leaders Mr Joshua 
Nkomo (ZAPU) and Rev Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU), which marked the first time the British had 
official talks with the African local leadership (Dias, 1967). 
 
2.9. 1970s – 1980 The road to Independence: Contestation for 
Liberation 
On 3 July 1974 an ANC delegation told the British government that it would no longer tolerate 
talks with the Smith regime and further demanded a constitutional conference to be attended 
by Britain and the detained African nationalist leaders. This marked the second time a black 
African party in Zimbabwe, the ANC, had talks with the British government. The talks were 
between the Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister and Bishop Muzorewa who was leader of the 
ANC Southern Rhodesian party.  A meeting in Lusaka was held in December 1974 and was 
attended by presidents of Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique.  Importantly this 
meeting showed some glimpse of hope for change in the near future as Joshua Nkomo and 
Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole were released from detention to attend (Ranger, 2004). 
In December 1974, leaders of the African nationalist movements signed the Lusaka Declaration, 
which unified ZAPU, ZANU, FRELIMO and the African National Congress (ANC) under the 
umbrella of the United African National Congress (UANC) and this union was chaired by Bishop 
Muzorewa.  This was the first time the Zimbabwean nationalist parties formed a coalition. This 
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would not be the last coalition in Southern Rhodesia as will be shown in the following chapters. 
This shows that the coalition of interest groups has been a recognized form of conflict 
resolution and has become a legitimate way to strengthen institutions in weak states (Matysak, 
2009; Kriger, 2001). 
The late 1970s were characterised by negotiations. In 1978 at the Malta Conference between 
Britain, the US and leaders of the Patriotic front (Mugabe and Nkomo), Smith negotiated for an 
internal settlement with Muzorewa and Sithole. The following year 1979 proved to be a 
significant year as it marked the first time Rhodesia had an African Prime Minister, Muzorewa, 
who won internal elections held by the Ian Smith regime. These elections were considered 
illegitimate as the Patriotic Front leaders did not participate in the elections (Ranger, 2004; 
Chiroro, 2005). This appointment of Muzorewa as Prime Minister was seen as “tokenism” 
because no real power was transferred to him. The police, civil service, the country’s economy 
and the armed forces remained effectively in the hands of the white minority government. The 
Government in Salisbury had hoped this would help persuade the guerrillas to surrender, but 
the guerrillas perceived the proposed reconciliation to be a sham and so the patriotic front 
leaders boycotted these elections, and thus the war intensified (Ranger, 2004; Kriger, 2001). 
Hence the 1979 internal elections were boycotted and that would not be the last time elections 
were boycotted in Zimbabwe by a populist political party. A similar boycott would reoccur in 
the 2005 senatorial elections, which featured a new opposition as will be shown later in this 
paper (Kriger, 2001; Chiroro, 2005). 
A constitutional conference was held at Lancaster House in London, under the chairmanship of 
Lord Carrington who was the Foreign Secretary in Margaret Thatcher’s government. At this 
conference, despite believing in having different strategies to achieve their goals, Mugabe and 
Nkomo both fought for the same cause. ZAPU’s strategy under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo 
was intended at forcing the British hand into submission while ZANU under Mugabe was 
convinced that the liberation in Zimbabwe could only be achieved if the Zimbabweans “took 
the matter into their own hands”, through guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, the relationship 
between ZANU and ZAPU remained strained because it was said that Mugabe was suspicious of 
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Nkomo’s negotiations with the British. He was convinced that Nkomo was ready to make a deal 
with the enemy and that would make the whole liberation struggle meaningless (Gregory, 
1980). 
As a desperate measure to end the violence in the country the Peace Accord was signed at mid-
day on 21 December 1979 which led to an effective cease fire. The Peace Accord could be seen 
as a form of a power-sharing peace-building strategy which helped create an environment in 
Zimbabwe in which fair and free elections could be held, if one considers the conflict 
transformation scholarship. Comparatively, a similar strategy was yet again to be used in 
Zimbabwe as will be discussed in the following chapters. 
It is said that when Mugabe and Nkomo returned from London they were welcomed by 
enormous crowds of approximately 20 000 people who at the time was the largest number of 
people attending a particular event in the history of Zimbabwe. This provided overwhelming 
evidence that the real support in Zimbabwean politics belonged to Nkomo and Mugabe (De 
Waal, 1990, p.44). 
 
2.10. 1980 Independence and Aftermath 
The elections were held in April 1980. Mugabe was very strategic in his campaign using national 
media platforms to campaign, particularly Radio Maputo. In his radio broadcasts Mugabe 
clearly outlined pro-democratic policies. He assured all white, colored and Indian communities 
of Southern Rhodesia that they had nothing to fear if ZANU came into office as long as they 
stood for democratic principles particularly equality, non-racism, justice and fair play. In a UN 
Security Council meeting in March 1978 he stressed that he was not fighting white people but a 
racist regime. This boosted his legitimacy in his run for office among the international 
community as it supported his vision (De Waal, 1990). 
The 1980 elections were contested by ZANU which was led by Mugabe, ZAPU led by Nkomo, 
the UNANC led by Muzorewa and the Smith party. On Tuesday 4 March 1980, when rumours of 
Mugabe’s victory circulated in the country, the white community started to panic because they 
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were not sure of their fate under Mugabe. Many families quickly put their houses on the 
market and prepared to flee to South Africa; some took their families and left for South Africa.  
The civil service saw mounting insecurity as many whites poured in their resignations in 
companies, ministries and banks (De Waal, 1990). 
Smith won all of his twenty seats which belonged to the white minority, Nkomo also won 
twenty seats, Muzorewa managed to get only three seats and Mugabe won the overall majority 
with 57 seats. In his first speech as Prime Minister which was broadcast on national radio and 
television, Robert Mugabe assured the nation of peace and stability and of seating a 
government which adhered to fundamental constitutional rights, human rights, rights to 
freedom and property rights. Importantly, he assured the protection of the pensions of public 
servants and went on to say “I urge you whether you are black or white to join me in a new 
pledge to forget our grim past, forgive others and lets join hands in the new unity and together 
as Zimbabweans let’s trample upon racialism, tribalism, regionalism and let’s work hard to 
reconstruct and rehabilitate our society” (De Waal, 1990, p.46).  
After hearing this speech the whites who had put their houses on the market withdrew these 
sales and cancelled their travelling plans. The next day after Mugabe’s speech everything in the 
country was back to normal, whites were back at work and their children were back at their 
schools (Ranger, 2004; De Waal, 1990; Kriger, 2001). De Waal (1990) called this a successful 
transition to democracy which is arguable given that the “two-turnover test” by Samuel 
Huntington (1991), who suggests that a consolidated democracy can be described only after 
competitive electoral elections have been experienced. The party that takes power in the first  
election must contest the elections that follow and possibly turn power over to the election  
winner, who in turn peacefully turns  over power to the winners of a later election; it is then 
that one can truly say a consolidated democracy exists (Huntington, 1991). 
It is important to note that one cannot dismiss or validate De Waal’s claim that there was a 
successful transition to democracy in Zimbabwe because the term democracy is interpreted in 
many different ways (Mottiar, 2002). Some regard competition as the main basis according to 
which democracy can prevail, when political rivals alternate power through electoral 
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competition (O’Donnell, 1996). Gunther et al (1995) however regard “institutionalization” as 
the only way to democratic consolidation. Institutionalization is where the political system 
adopts democratic institutions and processes which facilitate the rule of law to be upheld. In 
contrast, Diamond et al (1990) are critical of Huntington’s claims, arguing that electoral 
competition does not guarantee liberty and the rule of law. This means that there is a need for 
features other than just electoral competition, for example building institutions such as a 
judicial system will help to maintain liberties and the rule of law. Hence a substantive definition 
of a consolidated democracy is one that includes both electoral competition and 
institutionalization. 
On 18 April 1980 Zimbabwe gained its independence by winning the British supervised elections 
under the leadership of Robert Mugabe. A coalition government was later formed which 
comprised Joshua Nkomo and white ministers in Smith’s government who were allowed to 
retain their posts as ministers in the new democratic government. This was the first time 
Zimbabwe experienced democracy, as the elections were free and fair and it was the first time 
that a government in office was voted for by the majority (De Waal, 1990). 
After its independence Zimbabwe did not have any contestation between Africans and the 
British for the next decade. There were no clashes, the local Africans led a democratic 
government and they let the white people live in Zimbabwe free without any intimidation or 
repression (De Waal, 1990, p.29). 
 
2.11. The 1982-1983 Ethnic conflict: Gurakuhundi 
Zimbabwe was contested yet again between 1982 and 1984, in what is known as the 
“Gurakuhundi”, meaning “the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains”. 
This contestation was based on ethnic disparity between the Shona and the Ndebele. Over 20 
000 people died in the Matabeleland region, a region in the south of Zimbabwe which is where 
the Ndebele people settled after they migrated across the Limpopo following clashes with the 
Afrikaners  during the “Great Trek” in South Africa (Etherington, 2001). The “Great Trek” was 
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the north-eastward and eastward migration away from British control in the Cape Colony by 
the Boers between the 1830s and 1840s.  
In the early 1980s, Robert Mugabe who was Prime Minister of Zimbabwe at the time of the 
attacks in the Matabeleland region argued that the attacks were not directed at the Ndebele 
people but at “dissidents”. In contrast to the latter, there has been substantial evidence 
provided by villagers in Matabeleland and other scholarly work proving that the “Gurakuhundi” 
was a direct attack on Ndebele people. Zanu-PF defined dissidents as ex-ZIPRA guerrillas, which 
they perceived as a threat to Zanu-PF hegemony.  The crackdown on dissidents started when 
Colonel Shiri of the Zimbabwean army told the Fifth Brigade in an address that they had to start 
dealing with dissidents. The Fifth brigade was a special army unit which had received special 
military training in North Korea (Ranger, 2004). 
The Fifth Brigade moved to the Matabeleland region in January 1983 because they believed it 
was where the dissidents were located. The operation to eliminate dissidents was followed by 
repressive rules and laws which constrained democracy in the Matabeleland region.  A curfew 
was implemented in some districts in the Matabeleland region. It forbade people from moving 
more than 50 metres from their homes between dusk and dawn. All forms of transportation 
(buses, cars, lorries, bicycles and donkey carts) were banned from the roads. People caught 
violating any of the rules put themselves at risk of being shot. The right to freedom of 
expression was infringed upon, journalists were not allowed to leave Bulawayo (Bulawayo is the 
biggest city in the Matabeleland region) without permission and no unauthorized persons were 
allowed to enter or leave the curfew areas.  This measure was a form of propaganda as it 
hindered any news from reaching the curfew affected areas (Stiff, 2001, p.182).  
The Fifth Brigade harassed and murdered local villagers in their quest to find dissidents. They 
forced local villagers to pinpoint dissidents in the areas; if the villagers did not co-operate they 
were shot. The killing of many people in many rural areas forced people to migrate into the 
towns and cities. This operation against dissidents was seen as a direct attack on the Ndebele, 
for which there was convincing evidence. For example, the Fifth Brigade had been operating in 
the Mbembezi district for more than a week, yet the Mbembezi district had never had any news 
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of any dissident whereabouts or witnessed any delinquent activity that could have been 
considered to be of dissident character. Nkomo accused the fifth brigade of being a tribal and a 
political army which sought to wipe out the entire Ndebele ethnic group. This operation soon 
came to be infamously described as a brutal massacre of innocent people (Stiff, 2001). 
The genocidal attacks eventually ended when ZAPU and ZANU leaders agreed to sign a unity 
accord which led to the formation of a government of national unity, a strategy which 
effectively worked to end the animosity between these two parties.  It is said Nkomo agreed to 
compromise because he was afraid of another “Gurakuhundi” which would completely wipe 
out the Ndebele people. This made Zimbabwe a one-party state regime with ZAPU leader 
Joshua Nkomo being made the first Vice President, second in the hierarchy to Mugabe. This 
new government came to be called Zanu-PF (Patriotic Front) (Alexander and McGregor, 2001). 
Despite a history of animosity, this government survived for more than a decade. There was no 
significant contestation in Zimbabwe after the formation of Zanu-PF in the early years of the 
1990s. The same party has remained in power since independence; it is also in place in the 
present IG in Zimbabwe. Contestation only began in the wake of the formation of a new party 
called the MDC in late 1999 (Chigora and Guzura, 2011).  
In the March 1990 elections Mugabe and his party Zanu-PF won 117 seats of the 120 election 
seats. Voter turnout was at 54%, and the balloting met international standards. After this 
overwhelming victory, Mugabe embarked on a campaign for a “one-party state”, which he 
called on the Zanu-PF Central Committee to support. This campaign was heavily criticized by 
some of his fellow liberation comrades notably Edgar Tekere a prominent founding member of 
Zanu-PF who felt that a one-party state would be a restraint to what the liberation struggle was 
fought for. Eventually the “one party one state” was abandoned. In the coming years Zimbabwe 
received significant economic growth and had vibrant agricultural sector, such that in the early 






                                               Chapter Three   
The Decline of the Zimbabwean Economy, the 
Emergence of Opposition and Escalating Conflict 
3.1.   Late 1990s: Growing government dissatisfaction and the 
Emergence of the MDC 
The economic crisis in Zimbabwe started in 1996 and really hit the country in 1999 when the 
country experienced a prevalence of strikes. Wages of civil servants were low and health 
services were unaffordable. This prompted a national strike which affected mainly the poor and 
which caused drastic changes in health and educational services. This steady decline in living 
standards led to growing dissatisfaction with the government. The Zanu-PF government was 
continuously failing to provide security for the basic livelihood needs of most of the population 
such as health, education, employment and social welfare. The Zanu-PF government had been 
embarking on a massive campaign using national media platforms, television and radio 
promoting nationalism. Despite the overwhelming rhetoric of nationalism which was used by 
the Zanu-PF government, this nationalism did not bear positive results for the ordinary citizen 
in Zimbabwe (Kriger, 2006; Moyo, 2010; Ranger, 2004). Rather it prompted civic society to 
stage protests against the government. This resulted in major strikes in 1996 and 1998, which 
forced Mugabe to increase civil service wages convincingly. At this point mass action triumphed 
against government incompetence. This automatically created animosity between the 
leadership of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and that of the Zanu-PF 
government. The government publicly resented the labour union leaders, labeling them on 
national media broadcasters as “stooges of white imperialists” (Maroleng, 2005, p.8). 
More pressure continued to mount on the government as it received relentless pressure from 
the peasants and former liberation veterans, who expressed their frustration over the long 
delayed land redistribution. This impelled the liberation veterans to invade white owned 
commercial farms without authorization. As more government dissatisfaction spread across the 
country, by mid-year 1999, talks of having a worker’s party began to circulate around the 
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country. This prompted civic groups and the ZCTU to form a political party. The political party 
was eventually founded in September of 1999 by Morgan Tsvangirai who was the leader of the 
ZCTU (Raftopoulos, 2009). This party was made up of an alliance of trade union members, 
representatives of the business community, students, teachers, doctors, human rights activists 
and members of the ZCTU. In fact, it had representatives in every industry. This is one of the 
key reasons the MDC was able to survive political attacks by the Zanu-PF government because it 
was a highly diversified party (Alexander, 2007, p.386). This new party was named the 
“Movement of Democratic Change” (MDC), it lobbied for price controls, better wages for civil 
servants and greater economic liberalization and the reduction of the state’s role in the market. 
In fact it represented all those things with which the public was dissatisfied under Zanu-PF. In 
retrospect the MDC was evidently an alliance against Mugabe and his Zanu-PF government, 
because the MDC saw that government as a repressive regime. In the early stages after its 
formation, MDC support was limited to urban areas in Matabeleland and the Midlands province 
in Zimbabwe but as the economy continued to decline more dissatisfaction towards the 
government spread to other urban areas (Maroleng, 2005, p.8).  
Another important feature to note is that the emergence of the MDC was pivotal to the political 
situation in Zimbabwe, because, since independence was won in 1980 from Britain, Zimbabwe 
had been ruled by only one political party, Zanu-PF. The MDC emerged as the only credible 
opposition which really shook the ruling party Zanu-PF from being the status quo. All the other 
previous political parties had insignificant support to be recognized as credible opposition. The 
reason the MDC had an edge in the political arena was that it protested for a good cause which 








3.2. 2000 Land invasions and Parliamentary Elections  
The infamous mid-2000s land invasions began in February 2000, when a group of war veterans 
invaded two white farms. This was a glimpse of the long-standing grievance over the slow 
redistribution of farming land, despite land being one of the key elements over which the 
liberation struggle was fought. The government did not stop the invasions. Analysts suggest it 
was a strategy by Zanu-PF aimed at gaining more political mileage for its campaign for the June 
2000 Parliamentary elections which were drawing closer. Within a few months of the first 
invasions in February 2000, invasions by liberation veterans had spread to commercial farms 
owned by white people around the country. The invasion was marred by violence as some 
white farmers posed resistance to the invasions of their land, some of whom lost their lives. 
Reports circulated that Zanu-PF youth delinquently took part in the invasions, staging 
themselves as war veterans. These Zanu-PF youth militias are known as the “green bombers”, 
on account of their green military uniform (Kriger, 2006). 
The land invasions were very detrimental to the economy and gave Zimbabwe a lot of bad 
publicity in the international community. The output from commercial farming sharply dropped 
which caused the value of exports to fall by 30%. The government did not take any convincing 
action to stop the invasions; instead it legitimized the land invasions as part of a land 
redistribution program it called the “Fast Track” land reform programme, a three year program 
from 2000-2003. Some analysts suggest that the reason for why the agricultural production 
declined sharply soon after the land invasions, was that the new settlers, moved onto the land 
before they had appropriate agricultural know-how and capacity in place. In fact, most did not 
have access to loans to continue funding production and some lacked the expertise to run a 
commercial farm (Saunders, 2010). 
The aims for the land program were to divide the land equally and completely dismantle the 
legacy entrenched by colonial occupation, in the colonial period white people kept the good 
land for themselves, while the blacks were forced to crowd in unfertile land (Chimhowa, 2009). 
In addition, evidence shows that the redistribution of land is a first step and key to fighting 
poverty, especially in developing countries where most of the population is dependent upon 
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agricultural activities (Chimhowa, 2009). This left Zanu-PF desperately needing support. Given 
the economic crisis which the country was in, most of the support came from rural dwellers 
who believed their economic liberation could only be met through land reform and 
redistribution. Therefore Zanu-PF strategically used the ‘Fast track’ land reform as a way to 
nationalize the public and cultivate its support; they used the rhetoric that the liberation 
struggle’s main priority was to give land back to Zimbabweans. It was reported that within the 
space of six months, more than five million hectares were acquired under the Fast Track land 
reform programme (Chimhowa, 2009; Maroleng, 2005). 
In Zimbabwe, the year 2000 was a turning point for the country’s economy, as it was the year it 
collapsed. It is important to note that between 1999 and 2000, with the exception of South 
Africa, Zimbabwe had the fasted growing economy in the Southern African region (Maroleng, 
2005). Agriculture being the backbone of Zimbabwe’s economy, it catered for the livelihoods of 
over 70% of the population in Zimbabwe, hence when the land invasions started they proved to 
be a huge blow to the economy (Maroleng, 2005).  
The June 2000 elections were marred by violence, which started in rural areas but eventually 
spread to urban areas. This violence was highly politicized because the perpetrators were 
endorsed by state organs such as the police along with war veterans and Zanu-PF Youth. In 
urban areas the violence was directed at the opposition, the MDC leadership and supporters. 
Human rights groups, resident associations, civil society groups and people who bad-mouthed 
the ruling party became direct victims of this violence. Zanu-PF became reputably known to use 
violence as a political strategy during the subsequent elections in 2002 and 2005. These 
elections are still remembered for the violent outbreak against the MDC. There were cases of 
torture, beatings, detention, murder, arrests, abductions of the MDC officials and supporter 
(Saunders, 2010). 
As a result of the violent land invasions and further state repression, the Zimbabwean 
government lost its legitimacy within the international community. The international 
community responded by isolating Zimbabwe, cutting aid and imposing sanctions. It called on 
Mugabe to end the land invasions and to conform to democratic reform. The whole Zanu-PF 
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government and other affiliates of Mugabe were blacklisted in the US and Britain as part of the 
sanctions to force the Zimbabwean government to adopt pro-democratic practices (Jiri, 2011). 
 
3.3.   Mid 2000s: The collapse of the Economy and growing 
political conflict 
By the mid-2000s the economy of Zimbabwe had collapsed to shocking levels. The purchasing 
power of the average Zimbabwean citizen in 2003 had fallen back to the value it was in 1953, 
which meant all income gains earned since 1953 had been wiped out (Moss and Patrick, 2005). 
As of 2003, 80% of the population in Zimbabwe was living below the poverty line. By October 
2005, the inflation rate had reached over 400%. Inflation occurs when a unit of currency buys 
less food or other products and pays for fewer services. Generally inflation arises when the 
price of goods and services rises (Moss and Patrick, 2005). 
Zimbabwe’s losses in income during this period were shocking, given the fact that Zimbabwe 
was not at war and had not had any major natural disasters since 1990. These losses in 
Zimbabwe were greater than the losses which had been experienced in recent conflicts in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast (Clemens and Moss, 
2005). In 1998-2005 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined by 46,3%. The Zimbabwean 
government blamed the collapse of the economy on the sanctions imposed by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and accused Britain and the US of economic sabotage. Zanu-PF thought 
the sabotage by the British government was a response to Mugabe’s public rant against Tony 
Blair’s support for gay rights, Tony Blair was then the Prime Minister of Britain.  More practical 
reasons for Zimbabwe’s economic collapse were due to the major cut off of international aid 
and donors withdrawing from donating funds to Zimbabwe unless Mugabe practiced a more 
pro-democratic regime (Clemens and Moss, 2005). 
Poverty hit the country hard, there were major food shortages, people could no longer afford 
basic medical care, school fees for their children and unemployment reached its highest level as 
industries were closing down and the country was experiencing low foreign investment. The 
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government had overspent its national budget and all the country’s national gold reserves had 
run out, this put Zimbabwe in a socio-economic crisis (Chingono, 2010; Clemens and Moss, 
2005). 
By the mid 2000s Zimbabwe had become the world’s fastest collapsing economy. By 2004 
formal employment had fallen by 90%. The United Nations reported that out of the 13 million 
people in Zimbabwe, 80% were living in poverty. This forced many to leave the country in 
search for employment opportunities. Key destinations were South Africa, the United States 
and Britain. In 2010 the South African Home Affairs reported that there were approximately 
three million Zimbabweans living in South Africa (Saunders, 2010).  
The inflation rate reached a shocking 700% in 2005. The prices of basic commodities were 
increasing weekly and at times over night. The bank industry was in a shamble; it became far 
better to keep money in one’s house than to bank it, because the value of money would 
depreciate hugely overnight. In factual it was much better to stock goods than to keep money, 
the banking industry collapsed as a result of many people avoiding banking. The government 
resorted to printing money and to revaluing the Zimbabwean dollar. But that did not stop 
inflation, it actually worsened it. The inflation rate in Zimbabwe reached a world record, when 
it reached the 8000% mark (Chigora and Guzura, 2011). 
Eventually the Zimbabwean dollar was suspended in 2009 and the government put into effect 
the use of the US dollar as the national standard currency. Although the US dollar was adopted 
as the official currency used, the South African rand, Botswana Pula and the British Pound are 







3.4.   2005: Operation Murambatsvina, the Senate elections and 
further state repression 
 Maroleng (2005) describes how the government of Zimbabwe has adopted a greater use of 
military and police personnel to run state operations, programmes and to maintain public 
order. He criticizes Zanu-PF for not having clear intentions of ending the political crisis in 
Zimbabwe after the parliamentary polls in 2005 or a clear programme to help revive the 
collapsing economy. Rather after the election periods Zanu-PF embarked on further attacks 
towards its political opponents. The MDC personnel, supporters, affiliates and officials were the 
victims of these attacks. Mostly the harassment was carried out by the police, the military and 
the “green bombers’’ (Maroleng, 2005). 
On 19 May 2005 when Zimbabwe was in the midst of a severe economic, social and political 
crisis, the Zimbabwean government somehow felt it was the right time to embark on an urban 
clean-up programme code named “Operation Muramabtsvina” (Restore Order). This operation 
received a lot of criticism locally and internationally, because of the states excessive use of 
force. This clean-up operation was a crackdown on unlicensed street markets, traders, criminal 
activities and illegal structures. “Illegal structures” as defined by government were any housing 
structures which were built without housing plans approved by the local municipalities; these 
structures were mostly owned or rented by the poor. The crackdown was mainly centralized in 
urban areas and armed police and army officers were deployed to enforce this operation and to 
give eviction orders for the victims of the operation to return back to their rural areas (Bratton 
and Masunungure, 2006). 
The Zanu-PF government defended this operation as a planned program for urban 
resuscitation. On 9 July 2005, after immense criticism from the international community, the 
government launched a new operation with the code name “Garikayi” in the Shona language 
and “Hlalani Kahle” in Ndebele Language for stay well. The government claimed that the whole 




Besides the reasons presented by the government to defend itself for embarking on this clean-
up operation, the MDC maintained that the primary goal of operation Murambastvina was to 
destroy the party’s urban support base by forcing people to relocate to the rural areas (Bratton 
and Masunungure, 2006). Analysts claim that this operation aimed at destroying the informal 
sector of the economy, especially the parallel money market, which government believed to 
have been derailing the economy by diverting the desperately needed foreign currency away 
from the official economy. This would be very detrimental to families who were solely 
dependent on the informal economy since in Zimbabwe, this had been the only growing sector 
of the economy; economists estimated that it generated approximately 50% of country’s GDP 
(Bratton and Masunungure, 2006). 
A report by the UN Secretary General’s special envoy stated that the demolition of illegal 
housing structures affected more than 700 000 people. “The government in Zimbabwe must set 
a good example and adhere to the rule of law before it can ask its citizens to do the same” 
(Tibaijuka, 2005, p.12). The UN stated the clean-up operation infringed upon both national and 
international human rights laws by forcing evictions without a credible process. Given the 
economic crisis which Zimbabwe was experiencing and the critical food shortages in the 
country, Operation Murambatsvina was detrimental to people’s livelihoods. The UN reported 
that 2,4 million people were affected by this operation (Chimhowu, 2009). 
 
3.5.   2005: Parliamentary Elections 
In the March 2005 Elections Zanu-PF won 78 of the 120 elected seats, which gave it a two-
thirds majority in parliament while the MDC managed 41 seats. The MDC regarded these 
elections to be a sham as they claimed that the votes were rigged by Zanu-PF personnel 
(Maroleng, 2005). 
Furthermore Zanu-PF went on to impose repressive laws and modified the constitution so as to 
retain maximum authority, a strategy which was infamously used by the colonial government to 
repress any African uprising. On 30 August 2005 Zanu-PF used the Constitutional Amendment 
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Bill to enact clauses that gave the government an excessive amount of power. The first clause in 
the bill prevented courts from challenging the government seizures of land as part of the land 
reform program. Secondly the clauses permitted authorities to withdraw passports from 
individuals suspected to be travelling outside the country to conduct activities deemed as 
“terrorists”, and thirdly it re-established the senate ministerial posts which existed previously in 
the colonial period. This senate comprised of sixty-six members who would be voted for and six 
of that number would be appointed by President Mugabe while ten would be elected by the 
chief council. This meant that there would be sixteen legislatures which would be directly or 
indirectly handpicked by Mugabe. These policies skewed democracy as the right for the public 
to appoint its own chosen leaders was infringed (Maroleng, 2005). 
 
3.6.    2005 Senate Elections and further repression 
In addition, in 2005 the president appointed 30 non-constituency members to the parliament 
making the total number 150 seats. This made Zanu-PF untouchable, it gave them more than 
two thirds of the seats in parliament which automatically allowed it to change the constitution 
as it deemed necessary (Maroleng, 2005).  
Among the 30 appointed ministers, Mugabe reappointed his trusted lieutenants to key 
ministries such as the Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Information and Publicity, Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Ministry of 
Information and Publicity and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This left the MDC with the less 
influential ministries (Chiroro, 2005, p.4). Maroleng (2005) criticizes Zanu-PF for using its two 
thirds majority to centralize power instead of using it to stimulate political pluralism and 
economic recovery.  
 
3.7.    2005 The splitting of the MDC 
The introduction of the senate led the MDC to split up into two factions. The main reason for 
the split was because of a dispute over whether or not the MDC party should participate in the 
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election. The MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai opted for the party to boycott the elections, 
while the party Secretary General Welshman Ncube insisted that the party participate 
(Landsberg, 2004). 
Some analysts say that the split of the MDC was inevitable given the diversity of groups in its 
formation, as discussed earlier in this paper. Hence the MDC found itself struggling to keep 
these different social forces in unity, making a conflict of interest inevitable (Landsberg, 2004, 
p.8).  
After the official split of the MDC, the MDC-M faction led by Mutambara competed in the 
Senate elections while MDC-T faction did not as its leader Morgan Tsvangirai continued to call 
for boycotts. The November Senate elections were recognized as the lowest voter turnout since 
Zimbabwe’s independence. Only 631 347 voters voted out of 3 239 571 registered voters. Zanu-
PF won these elections with 24 seats and the MDC-M only managed to get all 5 seats in 
Bulawayo. Although Morgan Tsvangirai’s call for an election boycott played a part, Chiroro 
(2005) says “voter fatigue” was the explanation for the low voter turnout in these elections. She 
argues that since 1980 Zimbabwe has been holding elections every five years and all the 
elections have not changed anything, they simply regenerated the same results. Hence most 
Zimbabweans had lost confidence in electoral polls as a platform for change (Chiroro, 2005). 
The reason may be that the elections were not competitive. Diamonds et al (1996) and 
O’Donnell et al (1996) argue that besides the existence of judiciary institutions, subsequent 
competitive elections must also be present as it helps to consolidate democracy. At this time 
there was only one monopoly in the political terrain in Zimbabwe which was the Zanu-PF, all 
the other parties had insignificant support. 
 
3.8.    2008 Controversial elections and the implementation of 
the Inclusive Government (IG) 
In the March 2008 election, a combined MDC won 109 seats beating Zanu-PF which had only 97 
seats. The victory by the MDC was inevitable if one took into account the overwhelming evident 
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support towards the MDC which had spread country wide, simultaneously with the widespread 
discontent with Zanu-PF which had lasted for almost a decade dating back to 1999 (Ranger, 
2004; Ploch, 2010; Moss and Patrick, 2005).  
Zanu-PF supporters responded to MDC’s victory with violence, attacking the MDC officials and 
supporters, notably perpetrated by war veterans and Zanu-PF’s youth military (the green 
bombers). This caused a violent conflict between the two parties. The MDC-T leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai threatened to resign from politics fearing that a lot of lives would be lost and people 
victimized violently if his party continued to protest against Zanu-PF. Reports of mass violence 
against the pro-MDC supporters and affiliates were circulated all over Zimbabwe, there were 
also reports of retaliations from the MDC supporters. The country became increasingly 
politically unstable as violent conflict in Zimbabwe was at its peak since the liberation struggle 
which led to its independence in 1980 (Chigora and Guzura, 2011). In addition to widespread 
political violence, Zimbabwe was in a serious economic downfall. The inflation rate had risen to 
over 200 million percent in 2008. Zimbabwe was in desperate need for reform (Ploch, 2010).   
In the midst of the 2008 elections there were reports that Zanu-PF was rigging votes in poll 
stations. Tensions rose as Tsvangirai accused Mugabe of cheating in the elections. The election 
results were released after seven weeks from the election result release date, and the results 
indicated that the MDC-T had won by 47,9% votes and  Zanu-PF managed 43,2%. Therefore the 
results were declared inconclusive in that neither of the two political parties obtained majority 
vote of 51% (Raftopoulos, 2009).  
The decision to make a coalition government came after President Mugabe had failed to win 
the 50% votes needed to avoid a runoff and at the same time failed to placate his security force 
chiefs, who publicly stated that they would never salute a new President with no liberation 
struggle credentials. This was directed at Tsvangirai who had no liberation struggle experience 
but whose only experience was as a trade unionist and also meant that only individuals of Zanu-
PF affiliation would be considered (Stiff, 2001). 
Citing the widespread political violence and fearing the safety of his supporters Tsvangirai 
pulled out of the second round of elections. This left Mugabe uncontested in the second round 
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of the elections. The international community declared the elections in Zimbabwe a ‘’sham ’’ as 
there was no legitimate contestation (Raftopoulos, 2010; Chingono, 2010). 
There were newspaper reports from all over the globe reporting rampant  human rights 
violations and how Zimbabwe was devoid of the ‘’rule of law’’. The MDC alleged that more than 
500 of its supporters had been killed in the months after the elections. The police, the army, the 
Central Intelligence Organisation (CIOs), war veterans and the green bombers were implicated 
as the perpetrators of this violence. During this period, war veterans returned to invading white 
farms. In mid-April 2008, 100 farms of the estimated 400 white farms had been invaded. The 
rural areas in Zimbabwe were hit the hardest with post-election violence. The US Embassy 
documented that thousands of rural dwellers fled the rural areas to urban areas in the city in 
the months after the elections, fleeing the violence. Over 40 000 farmworkers were displaced 
by the post-election violence, with reports of burned homes and cattle livestock. A SADC 
spokesperson stated “we have seen it there are people in hospital who say they have been 
tortured, there are pictures of the victims and of the destroyed houses” (Ploch, 2010, p.5).   
In the wake of the elections the ten newly elected MDC legislators were arrested. Human rights 
activists and MDC officials were detained on charges of terrorism and treason. By the end of 
the elections approximately 100 election officers had been arrested (Ploch, 2010, p.6). A large 
portion of the population in Zimbabwe and the international community had lost confidence in 
the Mugabe led government. At this point it was clear that there was a desperate need for 
reform in Zimbabwe (Chigora and Guzura, 2011).  
The international community called for immediate political intervention to resolve the conflict 
in Zimbabwe because a civil war was feared. South Africa was given the responsibility to lead 
the peace building mission in Zimbabwe on behalf of Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). At that time the crisis in Zimbabwe had already had a negative impact on 
its regional neighboring countries. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki led most of the 
negotiations but was later replaced by President Jacob Zuma after the former’s dismissal from 
government. While still in office Thabo Mbeki received significant growing support for his 
mediation role in the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis and he also received support 
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from former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who stressed that Mbeki must convince Robert 
Mugabe to undertake democratic and economic reforms (Ferret, 2009).  
In addition to British government, the African Union (AU), United Nations and 14 Southern 
African Nations endorsed Thabo Mbeki’s mediation of the Zimbabwe crisis talks. Although 
Thabo Mbeki’s diplomacy received much criticism for his lack of coercion with Mugabe’s 
government, this mediation eventually convinced Robert Mugabe and the MDC leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai to enter into talks to try and resolve the conflict after a series of talks (Nathan, 2005). 
September 2008 marked a new era in Zimbabwean politics, as the warring parties agreed to a 
GPA which led to the formation of the IG comprising of the MDC-T, Zanu-PF and the MDC-M. 
The three parties agreed to an Inclusive Government to begin to bring democratic and 
economic reform to Zimbabwe. The IG brought hope for millions of Zimbabweans and the 
international community, as this power sharing government assured an end to the widespread 
political violence and had the potential to save the economy from collapse (Chigora and 
Guzura, 2011). 
The new unity government saw Zanu-PF retain the post of presidency and the post of the two 
vice presidents. Mugabe remained the President while Joyce Mujuru and John Nkomo retained 
their posts as the two vice presidents. Morgan Tsvangirai leader of the MDC-T was sworn in as 
the new Prime Minister of Zimbabwe and Arthur Mutambara leader of the MDC-M was 
appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Thokozani Khupe of MDC-T was also appointed to be 
Deputy Prime Minister. The core of the IG was based on Zimbabwe’s Constitutional 
Amendment 19. The rules of the power-sharing agreement were that Mugabe would share 
executive power with Tsvangirai (Mapuva, 2010, p.255). 
The IG was put in place as a transitional government and the GPA outlined a time frame for the 
drafting and the adoption of the new constitution. It also stipulated that Tsvangirai would chair 
the Council of Ministers and would be responsible for the day to day operation of government 
affairs. He would be in charge of the police force whilst Mugabe remained in charge of the 
armed forces. There were quarrels over who would control the Home Affairs ministry as the 
police force fell under it. To avoid further stalling the SADC called for negotiations, it was 
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agreed that Mugabe and Tsvangirai were to share the control of this ministry. Morgan 
Tsvangirai publicly renounced the deal as unworkable, citing harassment of the MDC supporters 
and at many times he threatened to pull out of the deal. Mugabe could no longer tolerate any 
further delay, so sternly said he would continue to name a new cabinet with or without 
Tsvangirai. This showed Mugabe’s disregard of Tsvangirai’s new role in government.  Eventually 
after a series of further negotiations, Tsvangirai announced he would join Mugabe in the new 
coalition government (Ploch, 2010). 
The first clause of the GPA allowed for 31 ministry appointments, and 16 of those appointments 
must be nominees of the two combined MDC factions. The constitutional amendment 19 also 
states that all the appointments made by Mugabe “in terms of the constitution or under the 
legislation” must be made “in consultation with” Morgan Tsvangirai, “in consultation with” is 
defined to mean “after securing the agreement or consent of effectively giving Tsvangirai the 
veto power over the appointment” (Matyskak, 2009). Although the GPA stated clearly that 
Tsvangirai and Mugabe were to share executive power, Mugabe seemed to still have more 
executive mileage as the police, the military and the intelligence agencies all remained under 
his control (Matyskak, 2009).  
The new transitional government was sworn on 13 February 2009. The MDC took control of the 
following ministries; Finance, Public Works, Public service, Water Energy and Power 
Development, Health, Education, State Enterprises and Commerce. Government ministry 
incumbent appointments under the GPA are shown in Appendix 1. On paper, one would think 
that power was equally distributed between Zanu-PF and the two MDC factions. But if one 
looks at where power really lies, it is evident that it still lies with Zanu-PF. Future quarrels 
remain inevitable given the power disparities in this unity government (Chigora and Guzura, 
2011). 
The GPA also outlined a time frame of 18 months for the drafting of a new constitution and a 
nationwide referendum on the document. The GPA was criticized for not having a time frame 
for holding elections. The setting of an election became one of the major issues quarreled 
about within the new unity government. The two MDC factions stressed for the need for more 
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time before elections could be held, with the argument that the Zimbabwean socio-economic 
and political environment was not yet conducive to host free and fair elections, while Zanu-PF 





















                                                               Chapter Four 
Accessing Power-sharing as a Strategy for Peace 
building and South African Foreign Policy  
4.1.   Assessing Power-sharing as an effective peace building 
strategy for Zimbabwe 
During the past decade over 20 million people have been displaced in Africa because of conflict, 
22 million people have died in conflicts since 1945 and 25% of that number died in the 1990s 
(Abebe, 1998; Hoeffer, 2008). Given the shocking statistics, it is important that conflicts are 
resolved in harmony so as to avoid any further loss of lives. Power-sharing has emerged as the 
new mainstream strategy of resolving conflict. Power-sharing models have become popular as 
implemented in many countries, for example in South Africa, Togo, Macedonia, Sudan and 
Kenya (Mapuva, 2010). The legitimacy of power-sharing has been questioned in terms of 
whether it is an effective way of resolving conflict or whether it is just a model to keep political 
tyrants in power who have failed to win elections fairly. 
There are strategies other than power-sharing that could have been used to solve the political 
crisis in Zimbabwe. For example in Egypt the public took their protests to the streets to oust 
President Mubarak, and the success of the protests was due to the passivity of the army, while  
in Libya the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) played a big role in pressuring the 
ousting of Gaddafi’s government (Ewen, 2011).  
The differing environments are the main reason a different strategy was used in Zimbabwe. 
One of the objectives of this dissertation is to try and unravel why a power-sharing deal was 
chosen as the key solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe. The South African foreign policy towards 
Zimbabwe is one of the reasons why a powering sharing deal was implemented. South Africa as 
a power house in Africa was criticized for not using coercive methods in solving the crisis in 
Zimbabwe. A military intervention would seem to have been the obvious action to take. But 
given its foreign policy South Africa’s aim was to reposition itself as a middle-ranking world 
power and a very powerful influential African state concerned with building partnerships, 
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ending conflict and promoting lasting peace throughout the African continent. Therefore a 
military invasion could have never been considered (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995). Another 
obvious reason is the friendship between the Zanu-PF and the ANC which dates back to the 
colonial period (Mckinley, 2004), this relationship is yet to be discussed later in this dissertation. 
 
4.2.   South African foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe 
From 1999 up to the formation of the IG in Zimbabwe in February 2008, South Africa’s 
diplomacy with Zimbabwe was largely a personal visionary design of Thabo Mbeki, former 
president of South Africa. Hamilton and Langhorne (1995) describe Thabo Mbeki as an 
unpredictable person. In this case Mbeki sought it necessary to break foreign policy norms in 
order to reach long-term goals. This is the reason why obvious actions like a military invasion 
were not in Mbeki’s plan (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995, p.159). 
It is also important to note that South African foreign policy under Mbeki’s administration was 
strongly based on an African Renaissance worldview. Mbeki was particular about Africa’s place 
in the global arena. In addition, South African foreign policy was not only based on human 
rights, democratization and respect for the rule of law, but it was also centralized on building 
solidarity in the Southern African region. This may be the reason why Thabo Mbeki convinced 
the international community that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was 
very capable of solving the Zimbabwean crisis and that there was no need for the US to 
intervene. Although Mbeki did not publicly say this but his diplomacy spoke in as many words. 
He believed African problems should be solved by African solutions (Broderick and Burford, 
2001; Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995).  
Mbeki’s dream was of peace, democracy and unity. He stressed that southern African states 
must transform into a zone of peace and that this could be done through democratic reform 
(Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995, p.161). This explains why a military intervention was never an 
option for South Africa’s conflict resolution efforts in Zimbabwe. This meant that assuring the 
absence of violence was its core priority. Thabo Mbeki may have been contradicting himself, 
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the dilemma here was that a military intervention in Zimbabwe may more likely have led to a 
quick ousting of Mugabe’s government and could have made Zimbabwe a democratic regime, 
albeit risking the staging of a civil war. But at the same time, avoiding a military intervention 
would maintain peace and keep a draconian government in power (Hamilton and Langhorne, 
1995). 
 
4.3. Power-sharing as the Preferred Model 
For one to understand the reason why power-sharing ended up being the preferred model to 
solve the crisis in Zimbabwe. It would be important for one to understand who Zimbabwe is 
perceived by South Africa under the Thabo Mbeki administration, the inconsistencies of the 
South African foreign policy, the relationship between the Zimbabwe and South Africa and the 
political capacity of the MDC to run state. 
South Africa and Zimbabwe have a political and economic relationship which dates back to the 
colonial period. In the colonial period Zanu-PF played a pivotal role in dethroning the Apartheid 
regime. After Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, while South Africa was being isolated by the 
rest of the world, Zimbabwe did not cut its ties with South Africa (Raftopolos, 2010). This 
relationship has continued to present day, at the moment South Africa remains largely 
dependent on Zimbabwean markets for its exports. This means any attempt to oust Mugabe 
would risk the loss of Zimbabwean markets and this would be detrimental to South Africa’s 
national economy as this translates to more jobs being lost (Muzondidya, 2009). In addition the 
vast significant presence of South African business in Zimbabwe remains a reality. As of 2000, 
South Africa replaced Britain as the biggest investor in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, South Africa 
relies on Zimbabwe’s road transport networks to reach other African markets such as the DRC, 
Zambia and Mozambique (Raftopolos, 2010). 
After taking into account the two countries economic relationship we see that if South Africa 
had treated Zimbabwe in a confrontational manner it would have put tension between the 
countries and this would impede South Africa’s economic interests in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, 
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if one takes into account Zimbabwe’s role in helping the ANC in the liberation struggle, one 
would see that if South Africa acted in a more confrontational manner towards Zimbabwe it 
could have been interpreted as an act of betrayal. As part of the ANC feels that it owes Zanu-PF 
and is obliged to show Zimbabwe some form of allegiance because of the two parties shared 
past (Mckinley, 2004). 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Mbeki’s government was determined to achieve its goal as 
a regional leader in Southern Africa. Therefore the only way to keep its ambition alive was by 
not becoming an enemy of Mugabe’s government as this would break its long relationship. 
Furthermore, this had to be done without totally sacrificing Western support. Therefore, 
endorsing a unity government was the only viable option which guaranteed that South Africa’s 
goal to be Africa’s continental leader would remain within reach without harming its 
relationship with the West (Saunders, 2010; Matyszak, 2009). 
The other reasons for the fostering of a power-sharing deal in the Zimbabwean crisis lay with 
the institutional goals of the MDC and its capacity to run a state successfully. Jeremy Cronin 
(2004) a key executive member of the ANC says that the reason the South African strategy in 
Zimbabwe was more lenient on Mugabe‘s regime is that in the Zimbabwe general elections in 
2000, the opposition MDC was viewed as a symptom of weakness and errors committed by 
Zanu-PF; the MDC lacked a regional strategy and was thought to need to rethink its post-
Mugabe regional strategy. In other words the MDC was regarded a party with insufficient 
capacity to oust a liberation struggle party (Nathan, 2005). 
Jeremy Cronin stressed that South Africa did not want a regime change in Zimbabwe through 
the use of a ballot box, because it would lead to violence. South Africa was convinced that 
Zanu-PF would not accept dismissal from government through an electoral protest; Zanu-PF 
was prepared to lift up arms against the MDC, which would lead to instability in the Southern 
African region. South Africa could not allow this since it had spent over a decade promoting 
peace in the South African region (Raftopolos, 2010). 
In the run-up to the 2002 Presidential elections and after the success of MDC in the elections it 
was clear to South Africa that the MDC had become a strong opposition and its immense 
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support could not be ignored.  At the same time Mbeki’s government still feared that the 
Zimbabwean military and security sectors would not accept an elected MDC government. 
Therefore there was a need for a solution which incorporated all these features of the political 
environment in Zimbabwe (Maroleng, 2005). 
Secondly the South African government was concerned that the MDC, if put in power, would 
not have the capacity to run a state and this particular weakness could lead quickly to an 
unstable state on its borders. If Zimbabwe became an unstable state, this could compromise 
South Africa’s (particularly Thabo Mbeki’s) dreams of making the Southern African region a 
peace zone area. Hence to have Mugabe stay in power was the only viable option available at 
the time. Therefore an effort by South Africa to remove Mugabe’s regime would only become 
an option at a time where an opposition in Zimbabwe exists with the military, policing and 
economic capacity to run a state. The last viable conflict resolution effort was to convince the 
MDC and Zanu-PF to enter into a power-sharing deal for the greater good of peace and regional 
stability (Raftopolos, 2010; Adelman, 2004; Mckinley, 2004).  
South Africa’s concern surrounding the MDC‘s capacity to run the state of Zimbabwe, brings us 
to acknowledge the fact that  popularity and getting the most votes in the ballot box does not 
necessarily merit that a party must rule (Raftopolos, 2010). There is a need for the party to have 
the capacity; the economic resources, security and military autonomy to run the state. Hence 
for the MDC to be considered a legitimate party to run a state it would have to take control of 
the national police and the military.  As discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation, the above 
argument serves to support Diamond et al (1996), Rose and Shin (2001) claim that competitive 
elections alone are not sufficient for consolidated democracy but that the latter must be 
supplemented by relevant institutions, in this case an effective judiciary and security sector. 
Considering the loyalty which Zanu-PF enjoys with the military and the police, the MDC would 
never gain the loyalty of the state in Zimbabwe. This also brings one to conclude that 
Zimbabwe’s hopes of a democratic regime and a violence free society rest on the existence of 
an opposition which has the political, military and economic capacity to run a state, which the 
MDC lacks its economic and security sector capacity (Raftopolos, 2010). 
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If one looks at the situation in Egypt, one might see that the ousting of the Mubarak 
government was a viable option because the opposition convinced the international 
community and peace-building mediators that they had the capacity to run the state of Egypt. 
The army’s passivity during the protests showed Mubarak did not have the loyalty of the army 
and also that the army was ready to help lead the transitional government to democracy. A 
situation like this did not happen in Zimbabwe because the military’s allegiance strongly lies 
with Mugabe and Zanu-PF, such that the public fears taking any protest to the streets since the 
military has been known to use excessive force against any anti-Mugabe supporters (Ewen, 
2011).  
Another reason is that it became clearer to Thabo Mbeki that the MDC had grown popular and 
had since gained national, regional (SADC) and international popularity and legitimacy. The 
donations from Western countries to the MDC were evidence of which side the Western 
countries supported. Taking into account Thabo Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy’’, one would assume 
that Mbeki felt compelled to come up with a model which included the MDC in the government 
so as to stay in “the good books” of the West. An “Inclusive Government” with the MDC would 
be in the interest of the West and this would also protect South Africa’s regional ambitions if 
Mugabe was included in the government (Raftopolos, 2010; Adelmann, 2004). 
Therefore Mbeki devised a compatible solution which was to convince the MDC –T and the 
MDC-M to share power with Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF, as he had hoped that if the MDC joined 
Zanu-PF in a power-sharing deal the political and economic favour which the MDC enjoys from 
the international community could be automatically spread out across Zanu-PF through the 
formation of the IG (Raftopolos, 2010).  
 
4.4.   Sanctions as a conflict resolution strategy: the failure to 
oust the Mugabe regime 
Sanctions are a very popular instrument in conflict resolution and have the capacity to influence 
change. Sanctions come in the form of economic setbacks and exclusion in the international 
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community. For example economic sanctions were used to pressure the South African 
apartheid government to engage in to democratic reform. Political power is directly connected 
to economic power therefore if the economic funds of a state are frozen in the long run that 
state will fail to operate effectively which weakens its capacity (Levy, 1999).  
South Africa has the capacity to punish Zimbabwe with economic sanctions, but has not taken 
any actions to do so, which is one the reasons South Africa is perceived to be lenient towards 
Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe relies largely on South Africa for electricity through South Africa’s 
parastatal Eskom. Given this dependency on South Africa, the threat to cut the supply of 
electricity to Zimbabwe could pressure Mugabe’s government to reform democratically (Simon, 
1998).  
However Tull and Englebert (2008) question the effectiveness of sanctions, they suggest that 
the effectiveness of state construction efforts through sanctions maybe hampered by a high 
degree of institutional resilience found in many failed states. A failed state is one where the 
government has lost its legitimacy in the public’s eye to provide the basic public services (Ellis, 
2005, p.136). This occurs when the state’s public institutions cease to function through 
corruption and violence. Examples of countries which have been labeled “failed states” are the 
DRC, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe (Tull and Englebert, 2008).The reality is that a failed state 
can endure times of failure and hardship. Consider Zimbabwe, a failed state with an economic 
inflation rate of over 8000%, proved resilient as government services continued to function 
(though in hardship) after it was hit by sanctions. The Ivory Coast and the DRC are other 
examples of failed states that showed resilience in times of hardship. Between 1998 and 2003 
when the DRC had been labeled a failed state, church organizations, NGOs and other 
philanthropic organizations helped supplement the provision of public services such as health 
and education, which the government was failing to provide (Tull and Englebert, 2008, p.125).  
Given Zimbabwe’s capacity to endure in times of sanctions, Mugabe’s regime showed no 
commitment to democratic reform, in fact the human rights abuse crisis worsened in Zimbabwe 
when sanctions were imposed. This could be interpreted in different ways. One may suggest 
that the reason why the sanctions did not work to influence Zimbabwe maybe that they were 
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ineffective. This would mean that more stringent sanctions must be imposed on Zimbabwe; the 
above point is supported by evidence of sanctions effectively influencing other draconian states 
to change to democratic reforms (Cox and Drury, 2006). 
Another reason for Zimbabwe’s resilience in the face of sanctions may be because of 
globalization. Globalisation cannot be ignored in a time where countries are interconnected 
across the globe (Kelly, 1999). It allows Zimbabwe to continue to conduct economic 
transactions with other emerging economies other than the US and the UK. Therefore if the 
latter is true, this would leave Zimbabwe with no catastrophic repercussions for losing the US 
and the UK. Evidence has been provided that globalisation stimulates economic growth (Tull 
and Englebert,  2008, p.126).  
Diamonds et al (1996) and Rose and Shin (2001) talk of the importance of institutionalization, 
therefore sanctions do build institutions but rather sanctions decrease the capacity of 
institutions to operate efficiently, through the direct  negative effects sanctions have on a 
country’s economic transaction. Therefore, for violence to decrease there is a need to build 
institutions which help avoid conflict from occurring or re-occuring and sanctions do not 
strengthen such institutions. Perhaps this is why violence increased in Zimbabwe in the face of 
sanctions. Another point to explore on may be the main objectives of the sanctions imposed by 
Britain and the US. One would see that sanctions were imposed for democratic reform but not 
with specifically defined objectives, like ending violence. A more comprehensive inquiry into 
the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe is needed for a thorough understanding of the dynamics in 
which they involved. This dissertation will not cover this in detail, as this might switch the focus 
of the research. 
 
4.5.   Reasons for the continuing political tension in Zimbabwe 
after the IG 
Prior to the signing of the GPA, the MDC believed that it deserved the right to govern 
Zimbabwe given its nationwide popularity, international legitimacy and past success in the 
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ballot box. Furthermore there was the reality that if free and fair elections were to be held the 
MDC would triumph while Zanu-PF’s legitimacy was on the basis of its liberation struggle 
credentials. We see that the two parties each have substantive arguments to be in government, 
which led to a conflict of interest (Raftopoulos, 2010).  
This means that the MDC’s hopes of ending Mugabe’s rule were only dependent on an electoral 
process which alone was insufficient, given the mechanisms which make a consolidated 
democracy. Deni (2003) has provided evidence to argue that the existence of a multi-party 
state does not mean that there are effective structures of democracy in that particular society. 
He argues that democracy must be needs more than just multi-party elections. Multi-party 
elections must be accompanied by structures that help maintain respect for rule of law, 
protection of human rights and freedom of political mobilization, for example with effective 
judicial systems.  
Tull and Englebert (2008) states that a lot of donors have been largely rated multiparty 
elections as a solution to establishing democracy. Donors tend to promote multi-party elections 
because they want to give the perception that they prioritize democracy above everything. 
Democracy has indeed reformed Africa, but the use of multi-party elections has had little 
impact on establishing democracy in Africa. For example the opposition in Africa has only won 
14 elections out of 100, evidence that a multi-party election is ineffective in removing an 
authoritarian government, especially if it is linked to liberation from colonialism (Tull and 
Englebert, 2008, p.116). For multiparty elections to be effective in establishing democracy there 
is a need for Huntington’s (1991) “two-turnover test” to take place as explained in chapter one. 
Another factor to explain the persistence of violent conflict in Zimbabwe despite the formation 
the IG, is that even after the signing of a power sharing deal, one would assume that power has 
been equally distributed  among the two parties and one would assume that each party has the 
power to create structures that promote democracy and  end violence.  It is not the case in 
Zimbabwe; the capacity of Zanu-PF to run a state is far superior to the capacity of the two MDC 
factions combined. In the current IG in Zimbabwe, state power is vested in the hands of the 
head of state and the head of government which is Robert Mugabe. Morgan Tsvangirai may be 
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the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, but the ultimate authority holding executive power is still by 
the president, Robert Mugabe. The problem is that without any executive power the MDC 
leadership cannot really create effective structures which can ensure effective peace-building 
and end political oppression (Chigora and Guzura, 2011, p.2). 
The existence of an opposition party in a country is very important because it increases political 
pluralism in the society, which helps to maintain a vibrate democracy. Opposition gives citizens 
another choice of leaders or political parties to vote for. In a case where the people are 
dissatisfied with their current government they can change political affiliation, the reality of this 
possibility can help curtail the current government to more democratic practices. In other 
words it helps monitor the current government of country to be accountable and provide 
better socio-economic conditions for its people. The argument here is that formation of the 
current IG in Zimbabwe detracted from the country’s two opposition parties, which are the 
MDC-T and the MDC-M, as they are now part of this new Inclusive Government. This means 
that Zimbabwe is devoid of an opposition and an institution to effectively monitor the 
government (Chigora and Guzura, 2008). 
It also important to take note that the MDC was originally formed by elite figures of civil society 
groups in Zimbabwe. For example, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai is a former head of the 
ZCTU. The limitation of the IG is that it has starved the people of Zimbabwe of a civil society, 
which is a primary necessity for a democratic Zimbabwe. Since the formation of the IG, civil 
society in Zimbabwe remains weak because civil society actors have politically aligned 
themselves with the MDC . For example, Gorden Moyo the executive director of Bulawayo 
Agency, a governance-based NGO, was appointed the Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s 
Office (Chigora and Guzura, 2008). 
There is also the notion that the solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe may not be dependent on 
the success of a power-sharing model. Johan Galtung (1969), with the theory of positive and 
negative peace suggests that the peace-building strategy in Zimbabwe should not just focus on 
ending violence but must focus on studying the reasons violence exists in the first place. This 
would have helped identify the factors to eliminate it. Rather, the GPA just stipulated that its 
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objectives were to end violence and political oppression but it did not stipulate to a mandate to 
find out the root of the violence and the conditions necessary for its end, which was a key 
limitation (Raftopoulos, 2009).  
Galtung (1969) proposes that for a peace-building strategy to be successful there is a need to 
have a holistic understanding of the conditions necessary to maintain the absence of violence 
and the conditions that trigger the occurrence of violence. Galtung (1969) goes on to say that 
negative peace is the absence of direct violence, direct violence being for example a personal 
assault, riots and wars. While positive peace is the absence of indirect violence. Indirect 
violence being poverty, hunger, discrimination and social injustice such as Apartheid. Which 
leads to the equation “negative peace + positive peace = peace”. This means that given 
Galtung’s (1964) positive peace theory, the solution to Zimbabwe’s crisis is not necessarily 
dependent on the IG, but on the holistic understanding of Zimbabwe’s environment. This may 
help pinpoint the root of the problem, which triggers direct violence and which may provide 












                                            Chapter Five 
                        Research Findings & Analysis 
 
5.1. Clustering of categories                                                                
To determine the status of politics in Zimbabwe it will be important to assess the categories in 
clusters. The researcher will use three clusters composing of the 50 categories to determine the 
latter.  The three clusters are three clusters are: 
i) Socio-economics in Zimbabwe 
ii)  The Rule of Law in Zimbabwe 
iii) Perceived Legitimacy of the Government 
The rationale for these three clusters is that they help in drawing up a conclusion on whether 
the political situation of Zimbabwe has improved since the implementation of the IG and help 
provide an assessment of whether the power-sharing government in Zimbabwe is a genuine 
unity or just an act of impunity.  
Miljikovic (2008) argues that the socio-economic situation of a country is an important 
determinant of the way the citizens perceive the government. Socio-economics have a direct 
and indirect impact on the political situation of a country. It impacts on the legitimacy, external 
security, the internal order of the country, the efficiency of the security sector, the judicial 
system and the extent of the government’s welfare provision (Merrian, 1945, p.31). Social and 
economic conditions tend to lead citizens to treat their governments in a certain way. For 
example, citizens who regard their socio-economic situation in a positive way tend to consider 
their government as more legitimate (Gilley, 2007, p.49). In addition, Gilley (2007) argues that 
economic levels of citizens have a direct impact on the political and socio-economic features of 
a country. In an analysis of 100 countries from 1960-1990, Barro (1996) provided evidence that 
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people in countries with a high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have substantially more political 
freedoms than countries with a low GDP. 
In addition, a government’s capacity to provide basic public services to its citizens determines 
the quality of the socio-economic condition in the country and also impacts on the legitimacy of 
the government. A legitimate government is perceived by its citizens as having the capacity to 
provide for basic public services e.g water, sanitation, health, education, housing and job 
creation (Soliman, 1998). 
It is important to note that a vibrate economy may at times work against the objectives of a 
peace building agreement especially if one of the peace agreement stakeholders is an 
authoritarian government (Ostby, 2008). Ostby (2008) further suggests that authoritarian 
governments may use public funds to sponsor the repression of the opposition, human rights 
activists and media agents and that this may intensify the conflict. For example during 
Apartheid, the South African government had one of the most vibrant economies in Africa. This 
explains the very high frequent reports of human rights abuses and the victimization of the 
media in Zimbabwe. The 2007, 2008 and 2009 Amnesty International reports revealed that 
most of the torture, intimidation, arrests, and violence in Zimbabwe were committed by 
government agents who are sponsored by state funds. 
Hence the categories under the cluster “Socio-economics’ in Zimbabwe” are Socio-economic 
incidents, Improvement of socio-economic situation, Inflation drop, Cash crisis, Riots, Strikes, 
Threat of strikes, Use of police, Use of military, Atrocities against minors , Atrocities against 
women, Tourism crisis and Formation of NGO/Unions/Civil society. 
Carothers (1998) argues that the “rule of law” has become a popular issue of discussion in 
international relations and has been seen by many as the answer to all the problems in the 
world. It has been established as one of the key fundamental features to conflict resolution, 
peace-building and to a prosperous democratic regime. The latter is also a critical feature in 
good governance. Skaaning (2010), for one, sees it as a synonym for “good governance”. Hence 
this means good governance and the rule of law are one.  
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Bollen (1993) and Stampfor et al (2006) see democracy and corruption as vital features to the 
rule of law. Hence democracy and the rule of law should not be seen as distinct but as a 
“beginning” and an “end” to each other. To say there is “the rule of law” in a country means the 
government must be ruled by the law and be subject to the law and that law should be just and 
fair (Skaaning, 2010, p.452). There should be features present to ensure the government 
remains subject to law, effective judicial systems are vital such as courts and tribunals which 
will enforce the compliance of government officials to judicial decisions. The accountability of 
security forces and the military, the protection of civil and property rights and the 
independence of the judicial system are the essential features for the rule of law in principle 
and in practice. The rule of law is the only way in which states can uphold law and order. Erias 
(2003) and Ngok (2011) argue that the absence of the rule of law will allow for the abuse of 
human rights and the mismanagement of public funds. This means that in any state where the 
rule of law does not exist, funds will be stolen by those with power and no consequence will 
faced by the perpetrators.  
Hence the categories under the cluster “Rule of Law” are the Human rights abuses, Political 
violence, Politically motivated deaths, Abductions, Repressive law’s, Public arrests, Land 
seizures, Victimization of media agents, talk of the Gurakuhundi massacres, Court trumps 
against government, Sanctions and International fallout. 
Gilley (2007) talks of three key features used to determine the legitimacy of a government, 
which are the institutionalization of democratic rights, good governance, the efficiency in 
service delivery, the presence of anti-authoritarian attitudes, gender equality, economically 
vibrant government and social trust (Gilley,  2007, p.47). The way the government is perceived 
by other institutions and states also plays a critical part in determining its legitimacy. 
Institutions like the African Union (AU), SADC, the UN, the International Amnesty, human rights 
groups’ civil society and other international organisations, world powers such as the United 
States, Britain and Australia usually comment on the norms and practices of a government’s 
exercise of political power. Newspapers also play a vital role in determining the legitimacy of 
the government because they monitor and report on all incidents and events which take place 
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in society and these reports help offer a truthful depiction of states. While Nwabuzor (2005) 
proposes that corruption threatens a government’s legitimacy. He argues that corruption has a 
“demoralizing” effect on the psyche of the citizens of the country who reside in other countries. 
It gives the country a bad image and these make external bodies perceive the current regime in 
negative light (Nwabuzor,  2005, p.130).   
Legitimacy may also mean how genuine a government is perceived to be by its people in 
rendering the duties of the government, which include protecting human rights, service 
delivery and protecting country against terrorist threats (Frank, 1990). Furthermore legitimacy 
may mean the extent of how a country is perceived by other states and other international 
organizations such as the UN and World Bank. The international community is more concerned 
about the country’s willingness to assure the rule of law prevails as the latter is the standard 
used to determine a country’s legitimacy. Legitimacy may at times be questioned, if a country 
has shown overwhelming evidence of violating the rule of law, of substantial human rights 
abuses and the failure of the government to provide basic services like sanitation, health and 
education; the amount of criticism the government gets also plays a part (Clark, 2007). 
Hence the categories under the cluster “Perceived Legitimacy of the Government” are 
Corruption, Negative comments towards Zimbabwe government, Government development 
initiatives, Government diplomatic initiatives, Government business international ventures, 
Donations from other states, Other states diplomatic initiatives towards Zimbabwe,  
Badmouthing, Plots & assassinations, Heckling, Zanu-PF & MDC talks, 
Instability/sabotaging/squabbles in the IG, Negative comments towards IG, IG gets approval 
and Unconstitutional appointments.  
5.2. Overall Findings & Analysis of Categories 
An overall analysis of all categories was conducted for the 3 newspapers (see Table 3 below) 
and subsequently each individual paper was analysed (see Table 3), in terms of frequency of 
reporting. The range extends as follows (based on 10 figure increments) from hardly (0-10); 
infrequent (11-20); sometimes (21-30); frequent (31-40) to very frequent (40+). Note a table 
showing the “Overall results by frequency for all three newspapers” is included in Appendix 3. 
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If one considers all 50 categories for the overall news report findings, 27 (or 54%) were 
reported as “very frequent”. The top 10% of categories comprise of Socio-economic incidents 
(878), Human Rights Abuses (304), Political Violence (281), Corruption (276) and Negative 
comments towards government from external sources (248). If we continue to provide the top 
10% of reported categories (i.e. the top 10), these include: Bad-Mouthing (192), Zanu-PF 
instability (187), Zimbabwean situation described as crisis/deadlock (183), Instability in the IG 
(155) and Government development initiatives (138). 
Interestingly, 90% of the top 10 categories of the overall analysis are negative, only 10th place is 
positive. This shows the acute degree of political and socio-economic crisis in Zimbabwe and 
reveals a country marred by appalling reports of corruption; criticized by many and described as 
being in crisis over 180 times; where political elites publicly badmouth each other on a constant 
basis, with a IG which is marred by squabbles, which may lead one to question the legitimacy of 
the power-sharing deal which was signed in 2009.  
Moreover, there are 4 other categories reported over 100 times; the Improvement of socio-
economic situation (131), Cash crisis (124), Strikes (117) and Victimization of media agents 
(105). This means that 28% of the overall categories are reported 100 times or more. Within 
this scenario, only 2 categories (4% overall) were positive. This serves to confirm the previous 
statement that the political situation in Zimbabwe has been in severe crisis over the past five 
years. 
Furthermore, the fact that more than 50% of the categories are reported “very frequently” 
(40+) shows that the degree of negative incidents in Zimbabwe is very acute. The fact that this 
criteria ranges from 43 (Donations from other States) to 878 (Socio-economic incidents) 
indicates a large difference even within this criterion. 
The categories which ranked between 40th and 50th place, were Tourism crisis (48), Threat of 
strikes (48) and Diplomacy with other states (48); Sanctions (49) and Donations from other 
states (43). 23 categories (46%) lie beyond this 10 point increment. This shows the 
extraordinary volume of negative incidents in Zimbabwe. The results of the top 15 categories 
are not only out of the norm but are extreme outliers. Our highest criteria “very frequent” is 
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41+; given the 10 point increment one might expect most results to be around 41-50. However, 
21 (42%) of the categories range from 56-878, which is a highly notable finding. 
Out of the 50 categories, 14 categories reported positive incidents. Amongst these were 
Government development initiatives/projects (138), Government Diplomatic initiatives, 
meetings (54),  Government business international ventures (8),  Formation of NGO, union, civil 
society or activist group (4), Formation of new political party (13),  Formation of new media 
outlet newspaper/radio (38), NGO/Church development initiative/donations includes health 
projects (53), Court trumps against government (33),  Pay hikes (20), Zanu-PF & MDC talks (18), 
Donations from other state governments (43), Diplomatic initiatives towards Zimbabwe (48), 
Inflation drop (11) and  Improvement of Socio-economic situation (131). 
This means 28% (a total of the above 14 categories) of the overall categories were positive, two 
are in the 0-10 range, three are in the 11-20 range, two lie in the 21-30 range, two in the 31-40 
range and three in the 43-54 range and only one with over 100 reports. If we compare the top 
10 reports on negative categories and the reports on the top 10 positive categories, a very wide 
disparity is evident. The top ten negative categories range from 124 -878 reports, while the top 
ten positive reports range from 18 -138. In addition, in that 28% (of the overall positive 
categories), nine were 55 or below. This shows that the negative reporting far outweighed the 
positive. The negative categories varied in the hundredths while the positive categories were in 
their tens.  
If one considers at the lowest ranking ten negative category reports; Politically motivated 
arrests (32); Plots & assassinations and ousting of Political elites  (32); Atrocities against women 
(30); Atrocities against minors (30); Talk of Gurakuhundi (26); Politically motivated Deaths (22); 
IG blasting(15); Public arrests (10); Instability in the MDC-T (13); Trade Union Instability (2). We 
see that 7 of the 10 categories comprised of reports which had a direct relationship to the 
political environment of Zimbabwe. In addition, if we use the normative criteria we see that the 
political situation in Zimbabwe is being affected negatively “frequently”. This serves to confirm 
the previous statements that the political situation in Zimbabwe has been in severe crisis over 
the past five years. 
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The lowest ten positive reports were the Formation of NGOs (3), Government Business & 
International ventures (8), Inflation drop (11), Formation of new party (13), Zanu-PF & MDC 
talks (18), IG gains approval (22), Court trumps (33), Formation of media outlet (38), Donations 
from other states (43) and Other states diplomatic initiatives towards Zimbabwe (48). Within 
the lowest ten positive categories we see the highest categories were directly related to the 
international legitimacy of the country. Donations from other states show the willingness of 
other states to give funds to the IG and if one considers the category analysis of each 
newspaper in their respective years it is evident that donations from other states only started 
increasing after the formation the IG.  
Similar to the above explanation, other states diplomatic initiatives towards Zimbabwe indicate 
the frequency with which the international community interacts with a country and this works a 
standard to measure the international legitimacy of a country. In this case it will help to answer 
the question of whether Zimbabwe is still a failed state. Other state’s diplomatic initiatives 
towards Zimbabwe also improved in the years after the implementation of the IG.  
Frequency analysis forms the basis of this study. However, given the fact that the three papers 
are reporting from different perspectives (the Standard News as a pro-opposition paper, the 
Sunday Mail as a state owned pro Zanu-PF paper and the M&G as a South-African based paper 
sympathetic to the opposition), it is necessary to consider what number of reports from each 
paper accounts for the figures in the overall reporting described above.  
 
5.3.   Findings & Analysis of the Mail & Guardian Reports 
The top ten ranking categories reported by the M&G are as follows; Socio-economic incidents  
(117), Zimbabwe situation described as a Crisis (60), Corruption (50), Human Rights abuses (42), 
Cash Crisis (34), Political Violence (34), Instability in the IG (29), Negative comments towards 
government or towards Zimbabwean Situation (27), Zanu-PF Party Instability (22) and 
Government Development Initiatives (19). Nine of the top ten ranking categories (90%) 
represent negative reports, while the “Government Development Initiatives” was the only 
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positive category. This reveals the severe extent to which Zimbabwe is marred by negative 
incidents. In assertion of the above claim the 2011 Amnesty International Report on Zimbabwe 
revealed similar findings. 
The Socio-economic incidents category has not only ranked 1st in M&G but has also been the 
category with the most incidents reported by the Standard News and the Sunday Mail. This 
shows the severe extent of the socio-economic crisis in Zimbabwe. In comparison, the M&G 
had significantly less reports on this category as compared to the Standard News with 573 
reports and slightly lower reports than the Sunday Mail which had 188 reports. These findings 
are expected as the M&G is based in South Africa; hence it would not be able to cover every 
socio-economic incident in Zimbabwe. Although the 117 reports by the M&G is relatively lower 
than the other two papers, 117 reports is still a large number, if one takes into account the 
reporting norms based on 10 figure increments. The norm shows that any category with 40+ 
reports falls under the “very frequent” reports. Therefore the 117 reports show that Zimbabwe 
has very frequent reports of socio-economic incidents. 
To assess the impact of the formation of the IG on the socio-economic incidents in Zimbabwe, 
one would have to make a yearly comparison of reports. The yearly reports by the M&G show 
that socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe improved relatively after the formation of the IG in 










Graph.1 – The M&G: Socio-economic incidents reports 
  
Graph 1 shows that after the formation of the IG in 2008, the number of socio-economic 
incidents reported in Zimbabwe declined. The graph shows that the decline in socio-economic 
incidents began right after 2007; this could mean that negotiation talks chaired by former 
president Thabo Mbeki had a direct effect in the socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe. This 
decline in socio-economic incidents continued to decline, from 25 in 2008, to 19 in 2007, to 14 
in 2009, 12 in 2010 and 7 in 2011.  
Other reasons which are secondary to the formation of the IG which could have to lead to the 
improvement of socio-economic incidents in Zimbabwe are the introduction of the use of the 
US dollar and the South African rand as the main standard use of currency in Zimbabwe. The 
investments made by China cannot be ignored; in addition the role by the third sector, NGOs, 
churches and international donors also played a significant role in this improvement. 
But according to the findings by the M&G, the above reasons can be dismissed as having led to 
the decline in Socio-economic incident reports. Donors from other countries or NGO initiatives 
did not impact on the socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe. The Donations from other state 
governments were insignificant with 0 in all the years except for 2008 and 2011 with 1 report 
respectively. Reports on NGO development initiatives were infrequent, there was average of 1 
report for each year and in 2011 they were 0 reports in this category in the M&G.  
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The 2nd highest reported category by the M&G was the “Zimbabwe situation described as crisis” 
with 60 reports. Based on the 10 point increment scales of measurement used in this 
dissertation, 60 reports means that they were “very frequent” reports on the Zimbabwe 
situation described as crisis. 
Graph 2 – The M&G: Zimbabwe situation described as crisis reports 
 
If one looks at the yearly reports of the Zimbabwe situation described as a crisis category, one 
would see that there are more “crisis” reports in years where elections took place and in years 
which are one year prior to elections. In 2005 there were the controversial Senate elections 
which took place; we have 8 reports in this year.  In  2006, a year where no elections took place 
we see reports on “crisis” reduce to 3 and in 2007, a year prior to the 2008 Presidential 
elections reports rose to 15. In 2008, a year in which Zimbabwe had several political events we 
see the “crisis” reports shooting to 22 and the year after the elections the reports dropped to 6. 
In 2010, crisis reports declined to 2, because it was a year where there were no elections and 
where Zimbabwe primarily focused on economic recovery. In 2011, a year which had been 
rumored to be an election year we see the “crisis’ reports rising to 4. These findings by the 
M&G show that in years where elections take place, Zimbabwe is at its most fragile, as those 
are the years in which it is most often described to be in crisis. In addition if one assesses the 
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impact of the IG on the political situation in Zimbabwe, if the graph above shows that in years 
after the implementation of the IG in 2009, the reports of “crisis” reduced drastically as 
compared to the years prior to 2009. In 2007 there were 15 reports, 2008 there were 22 
reports while in 2009 we see a drop to 6 reports and in 2010 to 2 reports and 2011 to 4 reports. 
Graph .3 – The M&G: Corruption reports 
 
In the M&G, Corruption was the 3rd highest ranking category with 50 reports, which means that 
there were “very frequent” reports of corruption in Zimbabwe. Another interpretation for the 
high number of reports by the M&G on corruption is that the M&G is a South African 
publication. In chapter 4 of this dissertation we learnt that the South African foreign policy in 
the Southern African region is centralized on the rule of law and the promotion of democratic 
governments. Hence one may interpret this to mean that South African papers will tend to 
monitor the practice of the rule of law and democracy in Southern African countries. Therefore 
this explains the extensive reports on corruption by the M&G. 
If one makes a comparison of the yearly reports on Corruption, one will see that corruption was 
at its highest in 2005 and 2006 and was at its lowest in 2007 with only 2 reports. Then reports 
on corruption started escalating in 2008 with 3 reports, to 2009 with 5 and 2010 with 7 reports 
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and in 2011 we see a decline with 4 reports. In years after the formation of the IG we still see 
reports of corruption escalating, possibly meaning that the IG did not enhance the judicial and 
other corruption curbing institutions. 
Human Rights Abuses was the 4th ranking category with 42 reports, which given this 
dissertations norm of measurement we see that human rights abuses were “frequently 
reported. Taking into account that the South African foreign policy towards the Southern 
African region is based on the promotion of human rights, this explains the extensive reports by 
the M&G in this category. 
Graph .4 – The M&G: Human rights abuses reports 
 
Graph 4 shows that the most human rights abuses were in 2005 with 10 reports and 2008 with 
11 reports. These findings correspond with the findings for the category “Zimbabwe situation 
described as crisis”. Graph 4 shows that in election years e.g 2005 and 2008, Zimbabwe had the 
most human rights abuses and in 2011 in year which was expected to have elections we see 
reports on human rights abuses rising. This pattern of reports is similar to the pattern in the 
category “Zimbabwe situation described as crisis”. The increase in Human rights abuses in 2011, 
two years after the implementation of the IG, may indicate the existence of ineffective judicial 
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and civil society institutions in Zimbabwe. This also shows the character of the security sector in 
Zimbabwe; it is evident that they still adhere to the excessive use of force. 
The 5th ranking category in the M&G is Cash Crisis with 34 reports, according to the norm 
measurement of this dissertation, 34 reports means that there were “frequent” reports of a 
cash crisis in Zimbabwe. Economics has always been an interest for every newspaper, especially 
for South Africa given the macro-economic fiscal policies which were introduced during the 
Mbeki administration. Therefore the frequent reports on cash crisis may be explained by the 
former. 
Graph 5 – The M&G: Cash crisis reports 
 
Graph 5 shows that Zimbabwe always had constant problems of cash supply in the years before 
the implementation of the IG. In 2008 were there were 8 reports, we see a decline to 3 reports 
in 2009, the year which the GPA was implemented, and a decline to 1 report in 2010 and 0 
reports in 2011. This is evidence that the cash crisis problem in Zimbabwe has improved. 
Another primary reason for the reduction in the number of cash crisis reports in Zimbabwe was 
the introduction of the use of the US dollar and South African rand as the an accepted official 




The Political Violence category also ranked 5th in the M&G with 34 reports, which according to 
the measurement norm for this dissertation means that there were “frequent” reports of 
Political Violence in Zimbabwe.  
Graph 6 – The M&G: Political violence reports 
 
If one looks at Graph 6 one will see that the M&G did not have any reports on Political Violence 
in 2005, even though 2005 was an election year. This is somewhat irregular, as it was 
established previously that political violence in Zimbabwe escalates in election years. Reports 
on Political violence started to escalate in 2006 with 4 reports and peaked in 2007 with 10 
reports. The graph further shows that incidents political violence began to decrease in 2008 
(year which the GPA was signed), for the years 2008 2011 the reports were 8, 6, 3 and 3.   
The category “Instability in the IG” ranked 7th in the M&G with 29 reports, which according to 
the norm of measurement used in this dissertation means that  there are “sometimes” reports 
of instability in the IG in Zimbabwe according to the M&G. Therefore this means that the IG is 





Graph 7 – The M&G: Instability in the IG 
 
 Graph 7 shows that the most instability in the IG occurred in its year of implementation in 2009 
with 12 reports. This was expected given the disagreements which the MDC had with the Zanu- 
PF in the division of power in the government. The graph shows that instability in the IG still 
exists as reports have been constant in 2010 and 2011 with 7 reports in each of the respective 
years. 
The category “Negative comments towards government or the Zimbabwean situation” ranked 
8th with 27 reports, which according to the norm of measurement in this dissertation means 








Graph 8 – The M&G: Negative comments towards government or Zimbabwean situation 
 
If one looks at Graph 8, one would see that Zimbabwe was criticized the most in 2005, which 
corresponds with what many have described to be Zimbabwe’s worst year in terms of politics 
and economics. In 2008 there were 0 reports by the M&G, this finding corresponds with 
infamously criticized “silent diplomacy” by South Africa in addressing the Zimbabwe crisis.  Even 
when Zimbabwe had made major steps towards change by implementing the GPA in 2009, 
there were still negative reports towards Zimbabwe; 2010 seemed to be a good year for 








Graph 9 – The M&G: Zanu-PF Party instability 
 
Graph 9 shows that in years were there were elections, Zanu-PF was least reported to have 
incidents of party instability, for example in controversial presidential elections in 2008 there 
was only one report, yet in the others where there were no elections, for example in 2007, 
2009 and 2011 the reports on instability were the most compared to the other years. In 2010 
there were 0 reports, the reason maybe that 2010 was the year where Zimbabwe was oriented 
more on economic recovery than political factionalism.  
Government Development initiatives was the tenth ranking category with 19 reports, which 
according to norm of measurement of this dissertation means that they were “infrequent”, 







Graph 10 –The M&G: Government Development initiatives 
 
Graph 10 shows that in years prior the implementation of the GPA, Zimbabwe had very minimal 
reports where the government engaged in development initiatives. But we see the reports of 
this category increasing in the years after its implementation. Therefore this means that after 
the formation of the IG the government was in a better position to engage in development 
initiatives.  
 
5.4.   Findings & Analysis of the overall Standard Newspaper 
Reports 
The top ten ranking categories in the Standard Newspaper are as follows; Socio-economic 
incidents (572), Instability in the IG (413), Human rights Abuses (243), Political Violence (217), 
Corruption (198), Zanu-PF Instability (176), Government Development initiatives (173), 
Badmouthing (143), Negative comments towards Government or Zimbabwean situation and 
Victimization of media agents (93). Similar to the reports by the M&G, nine of the top ten 
ranking categories in the Standard Newspaper are negative categories while the category 
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“Government Development initiatives” was the only positive category in the top ten ranking 
categories according to the reports by the Standard Newspaper. 
The massive number of reports by the Standard Newspaper in the Socio-economic incidents 
category shows the dire extent of the socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe as reported by the 
opposition. The 572 reports by the Standard Newspaper are 4,9 times more than the 117 
reports in the same category by the M&G. There are probably three reasons for the massive 
numbers of negative reports by the Standard Newspaper, one is that the Standard Newspaper 
is a Zimbabwean based newspaper therefore it would cover more Zimbabwean stories than the 
South African based paper, the M&G. Secondly, the Standard Newspaper is arguably the biggest 
opposition publication in Zimbabwe, and would probably put more determined effort into  
reporting every incident, which might have a likely chance of discrediting the legitimacy of the 
current government in Zimbabwe. Thirdly some may argue that although overwhelming, the 
incidents which are reported by the Standard Newspaper reveal the actual condition in 
Zimbabwe. 
Graph 11 – The Standard Newspaper: Socio-economic incidents 
 
Graph 11 shows that socio-economic incidents in Zimbabwe were the highest in 2005 and in 
2008 with 148 and 130 reports respectively. In 2009, the reports on socio-economic reports 
80 
 
started to decline to 109 reports and rose to 43 in 2010, with a slight increase to 56 in 2011. 
This shows that in the year of the implementation of the GPA, reports on socio-economic 
incidents reduced significantly although the reports remain “very frequent”. 
Instability in the IG category was the 2nd ranking category with 413 reports, which was 14,2 
times more than the reports by the M&G in the same category. The main objective of an 
opposition paper is to write articles which discredit the current government, and so this is why 
the category which represents the negativity of the current government ranked so high in the 
Standard Newspaper.  
Graph 12 – The Standard Newspaper: Instability in the IG 
 
Reports in this category only started being recorded in 2008 after the formation of the IG as 
illustrated in the graph above. It shows 2009 as the year with most reports on the instability of 
the IG, if one compares this with the M&G one will see that 2009 was also the year with the 
most reports on the instability of the IG. The reason for the latter is the fact the IG was still at 
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its early stages in 2009, as it was the year it was formed. The decline in the reports in 2009 – 
2011 (366, 24 and 14) indicates that the current state of the IG is improving. 
The 3rd ranking category in Standard Newspaper is the Human rights abuses with 243, which is a 
massive number is given the norm of measurement for this dissertation. The 243 reports by the 
Standard Newspaper is 5,8 times more than the 42 reports by the M&G in this category. 
Graph 13 – The Standard Newspaper: Human rights abuses 
 
The Amnesty International yearly reports on Zimbabwe and the numbers shown in Graph 13 
are similar; they indicate the severe extent of the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. With the 
exception of 2010 which had only 7 reports, the reports in all the other years indicate that the 
human rights situation in Zimbabwe still requires attention. The formation of the IG had an 
impact on human rights abuses because one year after the implementation of the GPA in 2010 
the reports on human rights abuses reduced to 7 in that year. But in 2011 the human rights 
abuses increased to 36 reports, the reason for the increase should not discredit the IG, but it 
must be noted that 2011 was a potential election year; therefore Zanu-PF engaged in mass 
intimidation of opposition supporters. This has been documented in chapter 2 of the 
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dissertation indicates that Zanu-PF tends to disregard human rights in times surrounding 
elections. 
The 4th ranked category in the Standard News is the Political Violence category with 217 
reports, which is 6,4 times more than the reports by the M&G in the same category.   
Graph 14 – The Standard Newspaper: Political Violence 
  
Graph 14 shows that Zimbabwe has had frequent reports of political violence incidents with the 
exception of 2010 with 14 reports. It is also important to note that after the formation of the 
IG, reports on political violence reduced in only two years, 2009 and 2010. Reports in this 
category increased in 2011 to 28 reports, 2011 was a potential election year. 
The 5th ranking category is Corruption with 198 reports, which is 3,9 times more than the 
reports by the M&G in the same category. This indicates that corruption is still a significant 





Graph 15 – The Standard Newspaper – Corruption reports 
  
Graph 15 shows that corruption is still haunting the political and socio-economic situation in 
Zimbabwe during the transitional period. Even after the formation of the IG corruption is still 
prevalent. This might be an indication that even after the IG; Zimbabwe still ceases to have 
effective judicial institutions to curb corruption. If one looks at the Socio-economic incidents 
category, one would see that in 2010 and in 2011 the situation in Zimbabwe improved and one 
would expect a simultaneous effect on the reduction of corruption. One would expect 
corruption to reduce, but it seems that corruption increased. This may mean that corruption 
could be spoiler being used to derail the IG so as to keep this institution weak. 
The 6th ranking category is Zanu-PF Instability with 176 reports, which is 8 times more than the 







Graph 16 – The Standard Newspaper: Zanu-PF Party Instability 
 
Graph 16 shows that Zanu-PF is a political party experiencing party instability and is only stable 
in the year of elections, as shown in 2008 when there were only 5 reports, also the year of the 
controversial presidential records. It is expected for an opposition paper to report its opposition 
in any negative way as possible. This may explain the massive number of reports in this 
category by the Standard Newspaper. 
The 7th ranking category is the Government Development Initiatives with 173 reports; this 
indicates that the Zimbabwean government does indeed engage in development initiatives in 








Graph 17 – The Standard Newspaper: Government Development initiatives  
 
Graph 17 shows that Government Development initiatives were very scarce between 2006 and 
2008 and increased after the formation of the IG, with 19 reports each in 2009 and 2010 and an 
increase to 23 reports in 2011. This finding suggests that the IG is indeed impacting upon 











Graph 18 – The Standard Newspaper: Bad-mouthing reports                                                                                 
 
The bad-mouthing category illustrates the extent to which the government is in disarray and 
may serve to discredit the legitimacy of the unity in the IG. Graph 18 shows that reports on bad-
mouthing were at their highest between 2007 and 2009 with 32 reports in each year. It also 
shows that bad-mouthing among government officials is it prevalent even after the formation 
of the IG, although the reports are not as high as in 2007 and 2008. 
The 9th ranked category is Negative Comment towards Government or the Zimbabwean 
situation with 141 reports, which is 5,2 times more than the reports by the M&G in the same 
category. This category ranked 8th amongst the top ten categories by the M&G. This indicates 







Graph 19 – Negative comments towards government or Zimbabwean situation 
 
Graph 19 shows that in the years prior to the formation of the IG there were many reports 
where negative comments were made about Zimbabwe. The reports on this category only 
reduced after the implementation of the GPA in 2009 and the reports continued to decline in 
the 2010 down to 2011. This indicates that after the formation of the IG, the legitimacy of the 










Graph 20 – The Standard Newspaper: Victimization of Media Agents 
 
The 10th ranking category in the Standard Newspaper was the Victimization of media agents 
with 93 reports, which was 6 times more than the reports for the M&G for this category. 
Reports on the victimization of media agents decreased between 2008-2011 with 27, 8, 2 and 9. 













5.5.   Findings & Analysis of the Sunday Mail Newspaper Reports 
The top ten ranking categories in the Sunday Mail paper are as follows; Socio-economic 
incidents (188), Government Development Initiatives (121), Improvement of Socio-economic 
situation (95), Corruption (84), Instability in the IG (57), Other states diplomatic initiatives (38), 
Political Violence (31) and Human rights abuses (27) reports. Four categories in the top ten rank 
of the Sunday Mail are positive, which is quite a disparity if one compares the top ten 
categories of the Standard Newspaper and the M&G, which both had only one positive 
category in their top ten rankings. This is evidence of how the Sunday Mail is sympathetic to the 
government, it will report more on categories which make the Zimbabwean government look 
more efficient. 
The 1st ranking category in the Sunday Mail was the Socio-economic incidents with 188 reports. 
This category has also ranked 1st for the Standard Newspaper and the Mail & Guardian, which 
means that there is consensus across all the three publications that the socio-economic 
condition is of the greater concern. It is important to note that the reports by the Sunday Mail 
on this category in the 2009-2011 are 3 times less than those reported by the Standard 
Newspaper in the same three years. This supports the claim made earlier that the  Sunday Mail 
is expected to be more sympathetic in reporting negative news in Zimbabwe, as this will reflect 










Graph 21- The Sunday Mail – Socio-economic incidents 
 
Graph 21 shows the number of reports by the Sunday Mail in the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
There were “frequent” reports of socio-economic incidents in 2009 and 2010, but we see a 
rapid increase in 2011 to 132 reports. If one compares the reports by the Standard Newspaper 
in 2011, one will see that there is a large disparity. The Standard Newspaper reported 56 
reports in 2011.This shows that even after the formation of the IG, the socio-economic 
condition in Zimbabwe as worsening. These reports by the Sunday Mail might be a strategy by 
the Zanu-PF to discredit the IG by arguing that the socio-economic after the IG is worsening 








Graph 22 – The Sunday Mail: Government Development initiatives 
 
The second ranking category in the Sunday Mail is the Government Development initiative 
category with 121 reports. Graph 22 shows that after the implementation of the GPA the 
number of government development initiatives increased.  
The 3rd ranking category in the Sunday Mail is the Improvement of Socio-economic situation 
category with 95 reports. This category only ranks in the top ten in the Sunday Mail only, in the 









Graph 23 – The Sunday Mail – Improvement of Socio-economic situation 
 
Graph 23 shows that there were there were “hardly” any reports but in 2011 they were “very 
frequent” reports in this category. This indicates that after the formation of the IG, Zimbabwe’s 
socio-economic situation had improved. But if one compares the Socio-economic incident 
category which had 188 reports and its contrary, the Improvement of Socio-economic 
conditions with 95 reports, one will see that there is a wide “infrequent” reports on the 
Improvement of the socio-economic situation in 2009, in 2010 disparity between the two 
categories. The Socio-economic incidents category is reported twice as much as the 
Improvement of Socio-economic situation, this means for every one positive there are two 
negatives. Therefore brings us to conclusion that the socio-economic situation is still in dire 
condition. One cannot dismiss that this could be act of propaganda, as it has been proven that 
bad news sells (Good, 2008). 
The 4th highest ranking category is Corruption with 84 reports. Corruption has made the top ten 
ranks of all three newspapers, which means that there is an agreement across all three papers 
that corruption is a significant problem in Zimbabwe. 
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Grade 24 – The Sunday Mail: Corruption reports 
 
Graph 24 shows that since the implementation of the GPA in 2009, the reports on corruption 
have been rapidly increasing. The likely reason for the increase in corruption is that it might be 
used as a spoiler to derail the transitional period. This is an expected feature in most states 
experiencing a transitional phase to peace (Billon, 2008). 
The Instability in the IG is the 5th ranking category in the Sunday Mail with 57 reports, this 
category also made the top ten ranking category for M&G and the Standard Newspaper. This 
indicates that the IG in is turmoil as the 57 reports mean that there were “very frequent” 








Graph 25 – The Sunday Mail: Instability in the IG 
 
If one looks at Graph 25 one will see that reports in the Instability of the IG decreased to 6 in 
2011, but in the previous years they remained relatively high. This graph suggests that in the 
first two years of the IG, it was in an unstable condition but has since improved. 
In the Sunday Mail, two categories ranked 6th, the Bad-mouthing category and the NGO/Church 
development initiative category with 44 reports respectively. In the Bad-mouthing category, the 
44 reports by the Sunday Mail were relatively similar to the reports by the Standard (42), while 







Graph 26 – The Sunday Mail: NGO/Church development initiative/donation includes health 
projects 
 
Graph 26 shows that reports on NGO/Church development initiatives were very low or “hardly 
any” in 2009 and 2010 but rapidly increased to 30 in 2011. This may indicate that the IG was 
seen more as a legitimate government in 2011, and thus that more donors were willing to 
donate funds to the government. 
In the Bad-mouthing category, there was a very high disparity between the reports by three 
newspapers. The Sunday Mail had 44 reports compared to the 143 reports by the Standard 
News and the 16 reports by the M&G. These reports reveal that the Sunday Mail is more 
sympathetic in this category as it had fewer reports, in an attempt to report less negative news 






Graph 27 – The Sunday Mail: Bad-mouthing reports 
 
Graph 27 shows that since 2009, there was a rapid increase in the Bad-Mouthing category. This 
pattern reveals how unstable the IG is, as the MDC officials and Zanu-PF officials are reported 
to publicly bad-mouth each other. It is also important to note that a significant number of the 
reports on the bad-mouthing category were within each political party. Disputes over 
succession issues was the may cause. 
The 8th ranking category is the “Other states diplomatic initiatives” with 38 reports, in this 
category the Sunday Mail reports were more than the reports by the Standard News and the 
M&G which had 21 and 17 reports respectively. This is the first category where the Sunday Mail 







Graph 28 – The Sunday Mail: Other states diplomatic initiatives 
 
Graph 28 shows a rapid increase in the other states diplomatic initiatives with 2 reports in 2009, 
5 in 2010 and 22 in 2011. This shows that the legitimacy of Zimbabwe was increasingly 
recognized by other states in 2011, as there were many more diplomatic initiatives with other 
states in 2011. In addition this may suggest that the formation of the IG helped the 
Zimbabwean government gain more legitimacy. 
The 9th category in the Sunday Mail is Political Violence with 31 reports; this category has also 
made the top ten with the Standard Newspaper and the M&G. This indicates that political 
violence is a reality in Zimbabwe which is haunting the transitional period to peace; this 






Graph 29 – The Sunday Mail: Political Violence 
 
Graph 29 shows that there were “hardly any” reports of political violence in 2009 and 2010, 
with 7 and 4 reports respectively. The 4 reports in 2010, indicate that in 2010 had the lowest 
incidents of political violence, and is one of the better years in Zimbabwe. In 2011 reports on 
political violence increased markedly to 20 reports, which indicates that the excessive use of 
force by the security sector still persists even after the formation of the IG. 
The 10th category in the Sunday Mail is Human Rights Abuses with 27 reports; this category has 
also made the top ten ranks in the Standard Newspaper and the M&G. This shows the dire 
extent of the human rights situation is in Zimbabwe. It is also important to note that there was 
a wide disparity in reporting between the three newspapers. While the Sunday Mail had 27 
reports, the opposition paper the Standard Newspaper had 243 reports and the M&G had 42 
reports. Hence this reveals that the Sunday Mail may be complicit in its lack of reporting the 




Graph 30 – The Sunday Mail: Human rights abuses reports 
 
Graph 30 shows that there were 12 reports of Human Rights abuses in 2009, 3 in 2010 and 12 in 
2011. This suggests that 2010 was one of the better years in Zimbabwe; the reason for these 
results is that 2010 was a less politically eventful year compared to 2009, which was the year 
which the GPA was implemented and 2011 which was an election expected year. In addition 
the above graph also reveals that the excessive use of force by the security sector still persists 
even after the formation of the IG. 
 
5.6. Findings of the Socio-economic Cluster                                          
In the category “Improvement in Socio-economic situation” the news reports for the years 
2005-2009 for the Standard News were very low but so significant improvements in 2010-2011. 
Similary for the same period the M&G had very low reports too. The Sunday Mail reports for 
the years 2009-2011 were relatively high. What we learn from this pattern is that socio-
economic progression takes time. After the signing of the GPA in 2008 it took approximately 2-3 
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years for significant changes to be seen and the most positive results were seen in 2011, 
according to the reports by all three newspapers. 
Category reports for “Socio-economic incidents” for the Standard Newspaper for the years 
2005-2009 were very high but had a significant decrease in 2010-2011. Although the M&G 
reports are relatively low compared to the Standard News, the reporting pattern for this 
category by the M&G was similar to the Standard News. The Sunday Mail reports showed a 
rapid increase in this category in 2009-2011. The results for the M&G and the Standard 
Newspaper show that there was a major decrease of reports in 2010-2011, which is 2-3 years 
after the signing of the GPA. If one compares the findings for the improvement of Socio-
economic category and the Socio-economic incident one will see that even though there were 
significant improvements in the socio-economic situation in the country, Zimbabwe still faced 
major socio-economic incidents. This just proves the extent of the socioeconomic collapse was 
prior to the formation of the IG.  
Strikes slightly reduced in the years after the signing of the IG but remained prevalent and there 
were no reports of “Pay hikes” in the years after the IG, which indicates that the public service 
in Zimbabwe still needs economic growth and is still a weak welfare state. Strikes are a 
response to grievances at the workplace, meaning that citizens would perceive the 
government’s functionality to be unsatisfactory. Hence this may lead to citizens to see the 
government as less legitimate (Gilley, 2007). Threats of strikes increased in the years after the 
signing of the GPA, which shows that the public service in the country remained vulnerable to 
instability.  
The reports on the categories “The use of Police” and “The use of Military” reduced significantly 
in the years after the signing of the IG, with the exception of 2011. This indicates that the 
excessive use of force by security officials did decrease after the IG but it remains a common 
feature in years which are politically eventful.  Atrocities against minors and women remained 
insignificant in Zimbabwe in the years prior to the formation of the IG and after. By comparison, 
the UNICEF South Africa Annual Report 2012 reported that South Africa has high rates of 
violence against women and children. One would like to think South Africa would have low 
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rates on the later, as it has more democratic institutions as compared to Zimbabwe. Hence this 
suggests that there is something peculiar about society in Zimbabwe as compared to South 
Africa. 
There was a slight increase in the formation of NGOs in the years after the formation of the IG 
while the reports on Formation of Trade unions remained next to nil. This suggests that the 
third sector was still weak. The reason may be due to Zimbabwe’s stringent laws on formation 
of organizations. Reports on the “Cash crisis” reports reduced significantly in all three 
newspapers in the years after the signing of the IG, the lowest reports were in 2010-2011. Note 
the tables illustrating The Socio-economic cluster for The M&G, The Standard News and the 
Sunday Mail are included as Appendix 4, Appendix 5 and Appendix 6 respectively. 
The research findings show that socio-economics in Zimbabwe have generally improved since 
the implementation of the IG. The extent of this improvement remains minimal although the 
lives of Zimbabweans have improved significantly. The improvement in socio-economics is one 
of the key objectives set in the GPA and is key feature that should be considered in order to 
ascertain whether the IG is working. These findings validate power-sharing as an effective 
solution to socio-economic reform. 
 
5.7. Findings of the Rule of Law Cluster                                                  
In the earlier discussion we established that reports on Human Rights abuses and Political 
Violence declined in the years after the formation of the IG with the exception of 2011 which 
was a politically eventful year. This suggests that in the years surrounding elections there were 
more cases of human rights abuses and political violence in Zimbabwe. 
The Victimization of media agents reduced in the years after the formation of the IG. For the 
years 2005-2008 there were frequent reports by the Standard News, while in 2009-2010 there 
was a sharp decrease in reports. While the M&G for the years 2005-2011 had very low reports 
and the Sunday Mail in the years 2009-2011 had hardly any reports. Looking at the reports from 
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the three papers we see that the victimization of media agents did decrease in the years after 
the formation of the IG. 
Reports on Repressive laws reduced slightly. In 2008-2011 the Standard News had very low 
reports. While for the M&G reports for 2008-2010 were also very low with a significant increase 
in 2011. The Sunday Mail reports for 2009-2011 were very low, 2010 having the highest 
reports. This suggests that the use of repressive laws increases in times surrounding elections; 
in this case they increased in 2011.  
Across all seven years investigated in this dissertation, “Court Trumps” were very low and 
remained very insignificant in the years after the formation of the IG. This category measured 
the extent to which the government officials, or security sector were taken to court by citizens. 
The very low reports show that the judicial system in Zimbabwe is still biased towards cases 
which involve government officials or Zanu-PF officials. Reports on Public arrests remained nil 
for all the newspapers in all years. Reports of Abduction were zero or very insignificant in the 
years after the formation of the IG. Reports on Sanctions were still emerged in the years after 
the formation of the IG; this suggests that some members of the international community were 
still not satisfied with Zimbabwe’s steps to reform. 
Reports on Land seizures continued after the formation of the IG. The M&G had frequent 
reports while the Standard Newspaper and the Sunday Mail reports for 2011 were very low; in 
2009-2010 all three newspapers had very low reports with the exception of the Standard News 
which had frequent reports in 2009 and while in 2008 the Standard News and the M&G had 
very low reports while the Sunday Mail had slightly higher reports This indicates that property 
rights are still not respected in Zimbabwe; white farmers are still being forcibly evicted from 
their farms.  
In the Sanctions category, we see a reduction of reports in all three papers, as they all had very 
low reports for 2005-2011 and 2011 had the least reports. This means that the perception of 
Zimbabwe by the international community did improve after the formation of the IG, but it 
took over two years for notable changes to be seen. Note that the tables showing the Rule of 
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Law cluster for the M&G, the Standard News and the Sunday Mail are included as Appendix 7, 
Appendix 8 and Appendix 9 respectively.  
 
5.8. Findings of the Perceived Legitimacy of Government                           
The Standard Newspaper reports on corruption for the years 2005-2011 were relatively high, 
while the M&G reports were low. The reports for the Sunday Mail reports for 2009-2011 were 
relatively high. These findings indicate that there was no significant change in corruption in 
Zimbabwe; it remains an issue. This supports the notion by Stedman (2005) that corruption is at 
times used as a spoiler in peace-building. 
“Negative comments towards government or Zimbabwean situation” category measures the 
number of times a negative comment is passed towards Zimbabwe. Hence the more negative 
comments a country gets the less its government is perceived to be legitimate. The M&G 2005-
2011 reports were low with 2005 having the most reports; the Standard Newspaper were high 
with a decrease in 2010-2011 while the Sunday Mail reports for 2009-2011 were high and rose 
rapidly in 2010-2011. These findings show despite the implementation of the IG, negative 
comments continue to be passed on Zimbabwe, perhaps because there have not been any 
perceived significant reforms in Zimbabwe except for the IG. The IG hasn’t impacted the way 
media and other international voices perceive Zimbabwe.  The dire socio-economic situation 
culminated in a great number of negative comments towards Zimbabwe. 
In the category “Government Development initiatives”, the M&G reports for the years 2005-
2011 were very low with a slight increase in 2010-2011; the Standard Newspaper showed high 
reports in 2005, a decrease in 2006-2008 and a rapid increase in 2010-2011. While the Sunday 
Mail reports for 2009-2011 rose. These findings show that there were significant government 
development initiatives from 2009. This could be interpreted to say that the government after 
the signing of the IG was more progressive than the one before. 
In the “Government diplomatic initiatives” category, there were hardly any reports by the M&G 
and the Standard Newspaper in 2005-2011; while the Sunday Mail reports for the years 2009-
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2010 were very low with a significant increase in 2011. The findings show that Zimbabwe’s 
diplomatic initiatives remained minimal even after the formation of the IG. If one looks at the 
news reports most of the incidents in this category were with South Africa and China. 
For the category “Government business international venture” there were “hardly any” reports 
in all the three newspapers. 
In the “Donations from other states” category, the M&G and the Sunday Mail reveal that these 
remained very insignificant after 2008 while the Standard Newspaper shows that the latter 
increased, the reports for 2008-2011 were very low with the exception of 2008 which had 
frequent reports. This suggests that the IG had no significant impact on the amount of aid given 
to Zimbabwe. 
In the category “Other states diplomatic initiatives towards Zimbabwe”, the M&G reports for 
the years 2005-2011 were very low, the least reports being in 2008 and slightly increased in 
2009-2011; the Standard Newspaper showed hardly any reports but had the most reports in 
2010 comparatively while the Sunday Mail reports for 2009-2010 were very low and had a rapid 
increase in 2011. These findings indicate that other countries were more willing to engage with 
Zimbabwe after the formation of the IG. This means the way other states perceived Zimbabwe 
seemed to change positively; one may argue that Zimbabwe was seen to be a more legitimate 
government after the formation of the IG. 
In the category “Zimbabwe situation described as  crisis” for the M&G reports for 2005-2011 
were high in 2005-2008 and decreased in 2009-2011; the Standard Newspaper were  low in 
2005-2007, very high in 2008 and significantly decreased in 2011 to very low. While the Sunday 
Mail reports for 2009-2011 were very low. These findings reveal that Zimbabwe was still 
considered to be in crisis even in the years after the formation of the IG. This shows the extent 
of the dire situation in Zimbabwe. Despite improvements in socio-economics, government 
initiatives, and engagement with other states, Zimbabwe continues to be in a crisis. 
The category “Instability in the IG” is important to the topic of this dissertation, as it answers 
the question of whether the IG in Zimbabwe was really a genuine unity. The M&G reports for 
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the years 2008-2011 were low but showed a steady decrease in 2010-2011; the Standard 
Newspaper were very high, 2009 had the highest reports while 2010-2011 showed a rapid 
decrease while the Sunday Mail reports for the years 2009-2010 were high with a rapid 
decrease in 2011. These findings reveal that the IG was frequently in chaos, with squabbles and 
disputes among the unity government executives. The most instability in the IG was 
experienced in its early years of formation. Despite a slight decrease the IG in Zimbabwe is still 
unstable, which prove that the IG was a forced marriage whose sincerity can be questioned. 
The Unconstitutional appointments” impacted upon the instability of the IG. In this category, 
there were hardly any reports by the M&G for 2005-2011; the Standard Newspaper reports 
were slightly low but decreased in 2010-2011 while the Sunday Mail reports for the 2009-2011 
were very low. The results show that the unconstitutional appointing of government officials 
dates back to before the formation of the IG, and after the formation of the IG unconstitutional 
appointing of officials continued, which shows that there is a disregard for the rule of law and a 
lack of partnership in the IG. There is still a power struggle. Note that the tables showing the 
Perceived Legitimacy of Government cluster for the M&G, the Standard News and the Sunday 










                                      Chapter Six 
                     Recommendations & Conclusion 
6.1. Possible Solutions for Zimbabwe                                              
Clemens and Moss (2005) claim that countries that have a poor socio-economic climate have 
greater difficulty in transitional periods than countries with a better socio-economic situation 
and that these tend to be in conflict in the early phases of transition (Clemens and Moss, 2005). 
In addition Barnett (2008) argues that a vibrant economy directly strengthens the capacity of 
other institutions necessary for the success of the transition to democracy. Therefore policies to 
improve the socio-economic situation of the country must be introduced such as establishing 
neo-liberalism in the economy. Neo-liberalism has proved to boost economic growth (Paus, 
1994). 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) programs should be considered in the 
peace building strategies for Zimbabwe. Theidon (2009) argues that there is a need to 
reconstruct the masculinities of security sector personnel. If one considers the particular 
psychological expectations of each role as a soldier or a police officer, one will note that there 
are certain characteristics of masculinities that are perceived by soldiers as traits that make a 
soldier or “man” such as the excessive use of violence, carrying a gun at all times and shouting. 
Therefore DDR needs to be explored as a viable option for Zimbabwe’s crisis, there is a need to 
reconstruct these masculinities perceived by former security personnel and current security 
personnel. The police and soldiers in Zimbabwe need to be made conscious that they can still 
command authority as soldiers and police without the excessive use of force. Hence a re-
integration program for the security sector in Zimbabwe would be instrumental for the 
reconstruction of masculinity of the Zimbabwean security sector. Therefore this should be 
added as one of the key objectives in the transitional period. 
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission process in Zimbabwe must also be considered as a 
viable solution given Zimbabwe’s history of violent conflict. A truth and reconciliation process is 
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a strategy which aims to resolve a painful past at the same time assuring a peaceful future. At 
many times it has proved difficult and controversial to have these two aims addressed because 
in order to assure a peaceful future it is sometimes advisable to ignore legal prosecutions of 
past offender (Shaw, 2009). There has been no Truth & Reconciliation Commission to resolve 
the Matabeleland atrocities in the 1980s and the victims of the controversial 2008 Presidential 
elections. Herman et al (2009) argue that as long as perpetrators of violence are not brought in 
front of a judicial commission, the remaining victims and the families of the victims will always 
remain in grief and resent any reform. This means there can be no reform without a truth and 
reconciliation process. Countries which have had truth and reconciliation processes are South 
Africa, Morocco, Panama and Ghana. 
The findings of this research indicate that cases of violence increase in times leading up to the 
election period; hence it would be better for Zimbabwe to extend the transitional period which 
will provide enough time for the strengthening of the necessary institutions to curb violence in 
Zimbabwe. Furthermore an extended period of this manner may relieve society of constant 
periods of violence; hence a prolonged presence of peace. It would also be easier to identify 
violence which is perpetrated in times which do not surround elections and would prove more 
difficult for Zanu-PF to protect its supporters under the party banner in periods which do not 
surround elections.  
 
6.2. Conclusion and Lessons                                                                        
The study has provided evidence that a vibrant civil service sector is vital for the success of the 
IG, and that an efficient security sector helps keep order in the country (Klitgaard, 1997). But if 
the salaries of police and soldiers remain unsatisfactory, there is the risk of them undertaking 
dishonest methods to make a living. This is the reason we see a lot of corruption in Zimbabwe 
and where most of the cases are being committed by government officials, particularly in the 
security sector and the police (Alexander, 2000). Henceforth salaries of civil servants must be 
prioritized, as their services are essential for the public. 
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In addition we learn that although corruption slightly declined after the signing of the GPA, it 
still remained prevalent. The absence of institutional structures to curb corruption is the reason 
for its continuation after the signing of the IG. One would assume that a genuine 
implementation of the IG would mean that there would be better institutional structures to 
curb corruption, but this has not been the case in Zimbabwe.   
We learn that the IG in Zimbabwe is still a delicate and vulnerable “unity”, hence any efforts to 
challenge a spoiler might cause the spoiler to intentionally disrupt the whole peace building 
processes. For example, cases of corruption have been ignored in this transitional period. This 
supports Stephen Stedman’s (2001) claim that when implementing peace agreements, it often 
proves to be a necessity to ignore spoilers or include them so as to keep the peace-building 
process intact. Hence Stedman (2001) argues that for spoilers to be included in the peace-
building process, any wrong doing by them must be ignored. 
We have learned that political violence and human rights abuses still exist in Zimbabwe; they 
escalate in times surrounding elections and decrease after the signing of the GPA. We also learn 
that violence is used as a strategy by Zanu-PF to stay in government in Zimbabwe. The latter 
supports Panitch’s (2002) argument that throughout history from church fundamentalists, to 
American militiamen, to the European Nazis and religious extremists in the Middle East, 
violence has been used as a strategy to maintain order and prevent change. 
Similarly Hafner-Burton et al (2012) also provided evidence that governments tend to increase 
repression during and immediately surrounding the election period, when they perceive that 
the political opposition threatens their position and when they perceive that abuse by its 
agents will only lead to a few negative repercussions. This dissertation has shown that this has 
been the case in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe we see a state which has had several multi-party 
elections which has held periodic multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections since the 
country’s independence in 1980. During the election period we see evident electoral fraud, 
violence and intimidation against opposition supporters is evident. Surrounding election times, 
opposition supporters, opposition officials, journalists and human rights activists risk arrests, 
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detention, and torture as they are targeted by the security forces under the ZANU-PF regime 
(Kriger, 2006; Chigora and Guzura, 2011). 
We learnt that multiparty elections do not exactly guarantee the exertion of political change or 
a consolidated democracy. For example, Zimbabwe has had many multi-party elections since 
1980 and only one party has been in office for over 20 years. 
The dissertation has provided evidence that in times surrounding election, political parties tend 
to have more stability and unity than other times. The reason may be that in times nearing 
elections, political parties tend to focus more on strengthening their respective parties in 
preparation for Election Day. Comparatively speaking, Zanu-PF showed more unity than other 
parties in the IG. One may conclude that Zanu-PF is an experienced electioneering party, with 
the capacity to strengthen its party’s position towards elections period better than any other 
party in Zimbabwe.   
We have learnt that demographic factors also play a part in the existence of violence in 
Zimbabwe. Amnesty International (2010) reports that most of the violence has been 
perpetrated by Zanu-PF youth militia, while the Standard News also provided evidence of this. 
The violence conducted by Zanu-PF youth is an illustration of a demographic factor. In 
Zimbabwe there are a lot of young men who see the mobilization for the cause of conflict as an 
attractive option for political promotion (Smith, 2005). 
The study has established that the absence of the necessary institutional structures to maintain 
negative peace is the reason for continued human rights abuses in Zimbabwe’s transition 
phase. Stewart (2001) and Lamborne (2009) argue that it is important for a political system to 
have a constant promotion of political justice structures to ensure the respect of human rights 
and to build an effective judicial system to curb all causes of conflict. We haven’t seen any 
effort by the government or by civil society to strengthen the judicial system; the only action 
which has been taken since the implementation of the IG is the drafting of a new constitution. 
The constitution making process revealed that the IG was still fragile, as it caused a lot of 
tension within the IG, evidenced by the research findings. 
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We have also learnt that there is a power dichotomy which exists within the IG, the parties that 
constitute that IG still see themselves as different from each other and therefore will always 
want to discredit and badmouth each other. This dichotomy remains the key reason for the 
continuing tension between the parties in the IG. Traniello (2008) proposes that in peace 
building, it is important for the political elites to understand that as divided as they are, they 
will have to coexist and accommodate each group’s interests to avoid a return to conflict. In the 
current IG there has been little convincing evidence of any willingness to coexist among the 
respective parties in the IG. This might bring one to think that the IG was a forced marriage, a 
response to a crisis country (Kriger, 2006). 
A poverty rate of over 80% suggests that there is a wide socio-economic gap among 
Zimbabweans. Hence economic inequality must be explored as another factor for the continued 
political tension. Cohen (1974) argues that men do not only fight over ethnic disparity but also 
fight over fundamental issues in society, which are the distribution of power and the way it is 
exercised.  
We have learnt that the civil society in Zimbabwe is fragile. All three newspapers reported 
hardly any news on the category “the formation of Civil Society” which is evidence that ever 
since the implementation of the IG, civil society in Zimbabwe seems to have remained passive. 
One of the key questions probed in this research was whether the IG had strengthened or 
detracted from civil society in Zimbabwe. Chapter three provided evidence that the detraction 
of civil society is not linked to the formation of the IG, but to the formation of the MDC in the 
late 1990s, since the formation included a diverse range of human rights activists, civil society 
champions, trade union leaders and church leaders. As soon as it was formed, the voices of civil 
society became the voices of the MDC and when the IG was formed some civil society directors 
were appointed to parliament (Chigora and Guzura, 2011; Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2007). 
We have not seen any evidence of strengthening civil society in the transitional period in 
Zimbabwe. This explains the continuing human rights abuses and the disregard for the rule of 
law, as evidenced in the Amnesty International (2010) reports on Zimbabwe. Transitional 
Justice and Peace building theory suggests that part of the peace building process must be to 
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build and establish institutions and structures (Lamborne, 2009). Civil society is one of the 
institutions necessary to meet the objectives of a peace building process to help preserve the 
rule of law and human rights.  
The dissertation reveals that “power-sharing” should not be dismissed as an effective model to 
resolve conflict, because it is dependent on the existence of the required institutions that have 
the capacity to hold the particular party in government accountable. We have learnt that 
“legitimacy” is one feature which is needed by any political party. As seen in  Zimbabwe, the 
only repercussions which Zanu-PF faces for breaking any GPA rule is the MDC-T threatening to 
withdraw from the IG, if this happens it will delegitimize the current government of unity and 
this is what is mostly feared by Zanu-PF. 
We learn that sanctions are still effective in curtailing reform in Zimbabwe but the extent of its 
impact is limited. Evidence of this arose when Zanu-PF war veterans engaged in a country wide 
anti-sanction petition campaign, which was arguably a success as they managed to get over 2 
million signatures. However, Ndlovu (2012) points out that this practice seems to have involved 
intimidation and coercion, since some people have reported that they were violently forced to 
sign the petition; the war veterans would not accept their refusal. But this shows how 
desperately Zanu-PF wanted the sanctions removed, despite the rhetoric that they had used in 
earlier election campaigns, where they boldly stated that they did not need any help from the 
West. The likely reason for this sudden interest in sanctions by war veterans lies in that, after 
the implementation of IG, they saw an improvement of socio-economic conditions. 
The dissertation has shown that after the implementation of the IG we see a slight increase of 
Zimbabwe’s interactions with other states. This means the IG may help rebuild the country’s 
legitimacy in the international community.  
The country of Zimbabwe has managed to recover from an economic impasse; public 
institutions have improved since the implementation of IG; education and health services are 
now available to the public at more affordable fees than before. The recovery of the economy 
can be credited to some extent to the IG but a large part must be credited to the decision to 
introduce of the US dollar as the standard currency of use in the country. 
112 
 
The number of incidents of political violence and human rights cases reported decreased after 
the implementation the IG except in times surrounding elections. This shows that the security 
sector personnel in Zimbabwe are still accustomed to the excessive use of force.  
The use of repressive laws in Zimbabwe still persists, though incidents of such have decreased 
since the implementation of the GPA. Opposition supporters and media agents are still being 
detained and arrested under these repressive laws like the Public Order and Security Act and 
the Broadcasting Services Act. Hence these legislations still need to be revised as it has been 
largely criticized to be a plot used to infringe human rights and to stall any efforts to 
democratize Zimbabwe. The IG was formed to avoid a situation where one party misuses its 
power, but the MDC has indirectly aided Zanu-PF as they have made no legitimate attempt to 
fight or campaign to stop it. 
Institutions which are meant to monitor the government remain void in Zimbabwe even in the 
period after the formation of the IG. For example, in Zimbabwe most civil society groups are 
aligned to the MDC and since the MDC is now part of the government there is a weak civil 
society in opposition to the government. Such a situation derails pluralism in society and thus 
derails democracy. Furthermore, most top civil society leaders have become part of the IG; this 
further diminished civil society. Therefore there is a need for a framework to strengthen and 
build more civil society organizations. It is up to the international community and business 
people and the intelligentsia of the country to form these organizations. The IG must also 
facilitate the emergence of civil society; they should not see it as a form of opposition but 
rather as a voice which allows democracy to prevail. 
In Chapter 4 we established that the key to a successful transition is the existence of 
institutions which maintain the absence of violence and which help curb the emergence of 
violence. Therefore reports of violence and human rights abuses will continue to be prevalent 
because, since the formation of the IG, there have been no institutions built to deal with 
present and past human rights abuses. The judicial system in Zimbabwe can still be 
manipulated and is sympathetic to Zanu-PF affiliates. This is the reason police, soldiers and 
Zanu-PF youth militias continue to cause havoc. Therefore a solution would be established if 
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human rights and judicial institutions were to be awarded the capacity to hold the government 
accountable. 
As discussed in the previous three chapters, what appears in Zimbabwe is a power-sharing 
model similar to the one which was formed in the 1994 government which ended the apartheid 
regime in South Africa where an elite pact was negotiated into government to stop violence 
and end conflict. We see that Mbeki used South Africa as a model template for Zimbabwe’s 
crisis which did not work as successfully as in South Africa given the different political problems. 
The exclusion of public participation in the formation of a government has long-term negative 
effects; it increases marginalization and undermines the legitimacy of government (Landsberg, 
2004).  
We see that the solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe does not necessarily entail a departure from 
a power-sharing model but must be based on a thorough understanding of the socio-economic 
and political environment of Zimbabwe, more particularly upon the causes of violence and the 
factors that maintain the absence of violence. 
This research has shown that Zimbabwe has been a territory which has been characterized by 
conflict and contestation dating back to the 1890s before the arrival of the Europeans to the 
present date with the current IG. The paper discussed the significant contestations in Zimbabwe 
such as the Portuguese vs the Rozwi empire, the Ndebele vs the Shona, the British vs the Shona, 
the NPA vs the Rhodesian government, the introduction of the UDI (Britain vs the Rhodesian 
government, the liberation struggle, the 1980 democratic elections the 1982-1984 post-
independence violence. The dissertation also discussed the decline of the Zimbabwean 
economy in the 2000s, the emergence of the MDC and took an in-depth look at every election 
in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2008 and the political events which took place until the formation of 
the IG. In that, we learn that Zimbabwe is a country which is marred by state repression and a 
disregard for human rights. 
The dissertation considered the events led place to the signing of the GPA, it discussed the 
reasons and alternatives considered to choose a power-sharing deal as the chosen strategy to 
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save Zimbabwe from an impasse. It offered a cohesive analysis of South African foreign policy 
towards the government and showed that South Africa aims to build partnerships in the SADC 
region, providing further evidence that the economic and historical past of the two countries 
are the reasons South Africa has shown lenience towards the Mugabe government. We see that 
Zimbabwe, though a failed state, has shown resilience in times of hardships, hence the reason 
sanctions have not been completely successful in fostering reform in Zimbabwe. 
The study established that the question of the “capacity of the MDC to run the state” is the 
reason Thabo Mbeki did not endorse an MDC-run government, which led to a compromise and 
to the establishment of the power-sharing government. This suggests that the reason for the 
continuing political tension and violence lies in the absence of strong judicial and human rights 
institutions which can hold all perpetrators accountable. 
The research provides evidence to show that a country in political turmoil will see the 
government of the day receive plenty of negative criticism. In addition, it provides evidence 
that a country will still show signs of instability in its early stages of transition. The features 
which render a country to be considered “in crisis” are still prevalent in Zimbabwe; political 
violence, strikes, human rights abuses, corruption, the use of repressive laws, the intimidation 
of media agents and socio-economic incidents. 
The dissertation has also re-established that power-sharing is a legitimate and effective conflict 
resolution strategy. And the extent of its effectiveness is dependent upon the existence of 
relevant institutions such as judicial systems, civil society, a vibrate economy, an efficient 
welfare state and a security sector which abides by the rule of law. The dissertation has also 
shown that it is difficult for the government of the day to share power equally with a new 
emerged party in a power-sharing government. The government of the day will always see itself 
as superior and as deserving of control, because of its past merits. 
The limitation of the study is that it did not offer any findings through primary data such as that 
attained from face to face interviews, which could have provided more qualitative information.  
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After the 2013 elections which took place on 31 July, Zimbabwe’s political future yet again 
remains in the hands of Robert Mugabe and Zanu-PF. Mugabe won 61% of the votes to claim a 
seventh term in office as President of Zimbabwe while Zanu-PF also dominated the 
parliamentary elections winning 160 seats. In these elections, Morgan Tsvangirai came second 
yet again with 33% of the votes and his party the MDC-T won 49 seats in parliament. Similarly 
to the elections before, the 2013 elections were marred by election fraud, state media bias, 
victimization of media agents, intimidation of people in rural areas and they were also reports 
of hundred thousands of people being chased away from polling stations (Mandaza, 2013). 
For the second time in Zimbabwe electoral history, the MDC sought to have the elections 
results nulled and declared void. Despite these allegations the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe 
ruled the elections, free, fair and credible (Smith, 2013). This is evidence that three years after 
the implementation of a transitional government the judicial system in Zimbabwe is still biased 
towards Mugabe and Zanu-PF. Given that Zanu-PF has been in government for over 20 years in 
Zimbabwe, may sum up a predictable future for Zimbabwe. A future where sanctions will 
continue to be imposed until Mugabe steps down, where cases of corruption are ignored and 
public funds are embezzled, opposition supporters and media agents are victimized.   
A more promising future is still possible for Zimbabwe, it can only be achieved if Zanu-PF cadres 
change the way they function in government and adhere to democratic reform; dedicate 
themselves to a new Zimbabwe run by good governance principles. When the current IG is 
being replaced by Zanu-PF, for its seventh time in office, it would be advisable for President 
Mugabe to keep some of the officials which belong to the opposition who are currently in the 
IG. Mugabe might want to go on national television and make a speech similar to the one in 
1980 as the first black Prime Minister in Zimbabwe, when he urged “black or white people to 
join him in a new pledge to forget their grim past, forgive each other and join hands in the new 
unity and so that together as Zimbabweans we trample upon racialism, tribalism, regionalism 
and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society” (De Waal, 1990, p.46). Mugabe 
should now urge that “whether MDC or Zanu-PF supporter, all should join hands together in 
building a new Zimbabwe under democratic reforms”. This may go a long way to assure the 
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nation of peace and stability, and of seating a government of national unity, which truly 




















Adelmann, M. (2004) Quiet Diplomacy: The Reason behind Mbeki’s Zimbabwe Policy. Afrika 
Spectrum. 39 (2) p.249-276. 
Abebe, A. (1998) Africa Conflict locked in Stalemate. Ethiopia: Associated Press. 
Alexander, J & McGregor, J. (2001) Elections, Land and the Politics of Opposition in 
Matabeleland. Journal of African Change. 1 (4) p.510-533. 
Alexander, P. (2000) Zimbabwean workers, the MDC and the 2000 elections. Sociology 
Department. Review of African Political Economy. 27 (85) p.385-406. 
Baron, D.P. (2006) Persistent Media Bias.  Journal of Public Economics. 90 (1-2) p.1-36. 
Barro, R.J. (1996) Democracy & Growth. Journal of Economic Growth. 1 (1) p.1-27. 
Burton, M. G, Gunther, R, Higley, J. (1992) ‘Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic 
Regimes’. In J. Higley, R. Gunther (eds.) Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America 
and Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Berelson, B. (1952) Content Analysis in Communication Research. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free 
Press. 
 
Bollen, K. (1993) Liberal democracy: Validity and method factors in cross-national measures. 
American Journal of Political Science. 37 p.1207-1230 
 
Bratton, M and Masunungure, E. (2006) Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation 
Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe. African Affairs. 106 (422). p.21-45. 
 
Barnett, J. (2008) Peace and Development: Towards a New Synthesis. Journal of Peace 
Research. 45 (1). p.75–89. 
 
Bollen, K. (1993) Liberal democracy: validity and method factors in cross-national measures. 




Broderick, J & Burford, G. (2001) South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemma of a New Democracy: 
New York: Palgrave Publishers. 
Chitiyo, K & Rupiya, M. (2007) Tracking Zimbabwe’s political history: The Zimbabwe Defence 
Force from 1980–2005. Pretoria:  Institute of Security Studies.  
Clark, Ian. (2007) International Legitimacy and World Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Carothers, T. (1998) The Rule of Law Revival. Foreign Affairs. 77 (2) p.95-106. 
 
Creswell, John W. (2003) Research design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Chigora, P & Guzura, T. (2011) The politics of the government of national unity (GNU) and 
Power sharing in Zimbabwe: Challenges and Prospects for democracy.  African Journal of 
History and Culture. 3 (2) p.20-26. 
Chimhowu, A. (2009) Moving Forward in Zimbabwe Reducing Poverty and Promoting 
Production. Manchester: Brooks World Poverty Institute.  
Chingono, H. (2010) Economic Sanctions: A Panacea to Democracy and Good Governance in 
Zimbabwe ?. Turkish Journal of International Studies. 9 (1) p.66- 74. 
Chiroro, B. (2005) Apathy, Fatigue or Boycott ? An Analysis of the 2005 Zimbabwe Senate 
Elections. EISA Occasional Paper. 
Cox, D and Drury, A. (2006) Democratic sanctions: Connecting the democratic peace and 
economic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research. 43 (6) p.709-722. 
Cohen, A. (1974) Two-dimensional man: An essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism 
in complex society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Clemens, B & Moss, T. (2005) Costs and Causes of Zimbabwe’s Crisis. Center for Global 




Diamond, L, Linz, J and Lipset, S. (1990) “Introduction: Comparing Experiences with 
Democracy.” Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Dias, R. (1967) The U.D.I Case: The Grundnorm in Travail. The Cambridge Law Journal.  25 (1) 
p.5-10.  
Deni, V. (2003) Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa: Recent elections in Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Lesotho. Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review. 19 p.1-39. 
De Waal, V. (1990) The Politics of Reconciliation: Zimbabwe’s First Decade. Cape Town: David 
Philip. 
Ewen, M. (2011) Egypt Protests: Us resist calls to cut aid. The Guardian. 4 February 2011. 
[Online] Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/04/egypt-protests-us-
military-aid . [Accessed: 25 June 2013]. 
Erias, I. (2003) Ethics, Corruption, and Economic Freedom. Washington DC: Heritage 
Foundations. 
Englebert, P & Tull, D. (2008) Postconflict reconstruction in Africa: Flawed ideas about failed 
bbs. International Security.  32 (4) p.106–139. 
 
Etherington, N. (2001) The Great Treks: the transformation of South Africa, 1815–1854. 
London: Longman 
 
Elo ,S & Kyngäs, H. (2007) The qualitative content analysis process. Journal of Advanced 
Nursing. 62 (1) p.107–115. 
Esterhuysen, P. (2004) Zimbabwe: A historical Review. Institute of Strategic Studies. 
Ferret, G. (2009) “Zimbabwe elite seeks to evade sanctions”. BBC News. 24 February 2009. 




Gregory, M. (1980) From Lusaka to Lancaster House. The World Today. 36 (1) p.11-18.  
Gunther,R , Diamandouros, N and Hans-Jurgen, P. (1995) The Politics of Democratic 
Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Good, J. (2008) The Framing of Climate Change in Canadian, American, and International 
Newspapers: A Media Propaganda Model Analysis. Canadian Journal of Communication. 33  
p.233-255. 
 
Gilley, B. (2006) The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries. International 
Political Science Review. 27 (1) p.47-71. 
 
Galtung, J. (1969) Violence, Peace and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research. 6 (3) p.167-
191. 
 
Govea, R.M & Holm, J.D. (1998) Crisis, violence and political succession in Africa. Third World 
Quarterly. 19 (1) p.129-148.  
 
Gadzikwa, J. (2009) Online Media and Democracy: A Critical Analysis of the Role played by 
Zimbabwe’s online English Newspapers in the Run-up to 2008 Elections. Pietermaritzburg: 
University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
Gwisai, M. (2002) ‘Revolutionaries, Resistance, and Crisis in Zimbabwe’, in Zeilig, L., (eds) Class 
Struggle and Resistance in Africa, Chicago: Haymarket Books. 
 
Gonzalez, L.E. (2008) Political Crises and Democracy in Latin America since the end of the Cold 
War. Working Paper #353. The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies. 
Huntington, S. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 
121 
 
Hoeffer, A. (2008) Dealing with the Consequences of Violent Conflict in Africa. African 
Development Bank Report. University of Oxford. Centre for the Study of African Economies 
Harwood, T & Garry, T. (2003) An overview of content analysis. The Marketing Review. 3 (4) 
p.479-498. 
Herman, J , Sriram, C and Martin-Ortega, O. (2009) Beyond justice versus peace: transitional 
justice and peace-building strategies . Sweden: Lund University. 
 
Hamilton, K & Langhorne , R. (1995) The Practise of Diplomacy: its evolution, theory and 
Administration. London and New York: Routeldge. 
Landsberg ,C. (2004) The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa’s 
Transition. Johannesburg:  Jacana Media. 
Lambourne, W.  (2009) “Transitional Justice and Peace-building after Mass Violence”. 
International Journal of Transitional Justice. 3 (1) p.28-48.  
 
Lindolf, T & Taylor, B. (2002) Qualitative communication research methods (2nd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Lloyd, T. O. (1995) The British Empire, 1558-1985, 2nd Ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Levy ,P. (1999) Sanctions on South Africa: What did they do ?. American Economic Review. 89 
(2) p.415-420. 
Lyons, T. (2002) Post Conflict Elections: War Termination, Democratization, and Demilitarization 
of Politics. Working Paper No. 20. Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. George Mason 
University. 
Jiri, J. (2011) European Union extends sanctions on ZANU-PF officials. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.zimeye.org/?p=26823 [Accessed:16 February 2011]. 
Kelly P.F. (1999) The Geographies and Politics of Globalisation. South East Asian Programme. 
National University of Singapore: Sage Publications. 
122 
 
Klitgaard, R. (1997) Cleaning up and invigorating the civil service. Public Administration and 
Development . 17 (5) p.487–509.  
 
Krippendorff, K. (1980) Content Analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology. The Sage 
Commtext Series. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Kriger, N. (2006) From Patriotic Memories to Patriotic History in Zimbabwe, 1990-2005. Third 
World Quartely. 27 (6) p.1151-1169. 
Kriger, N. (2004) Guerrilla Veterans in Postwar Zimbabwe. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
O’Donnell, G. (2007) “Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America,” in his Dissonances: 
Democratic Critiques of Democracy. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Ostby, G. (2008) ‘Inequalities, the political environment and civil conflict: evidence from 55 
developing countries.’ In: F. Stewart (Ed.) Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding 
group violence in multiethnic societies (Page 136–162). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Machigaidze, V. (1991) Agrarian Change from Above: The Southern Rhodesia Native Land Husbandry 
Act and African Response. The International Journal of African Historical Studies. 24 (3) p.557-588. 
Miljkovic, D  & Rimal, A. (2008) The impact of socio-economic factors on political instability: A 
cross-country analysis. Journal of Socio-Economics. Missouri State University: Elsevier. 
 
Munganidze, O.A. (2009) Post-Election Power-Sharing Governments and the Future of 
Democracy in Africa. Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria.  
Mapuva, J. (2010) Government of  National  Unity (GNU) as a  Conflict Prevention Strategy: Case 
of Zimbabwe and Kenya . Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa. 12 (6) p.247-263. 
Mandaza, I. (2013) “Reflections on the 2013 Zimbabwe Elections”, The Mail & Guardian. 8 
August. Available from http://mg.co.za/article/2013-08-08-00-reflections-on-the-2013-
zimbabwe-elections . [Accessed: 16 November 2013]. 
123 
 
Mckinley, D. T. (2004) Commodifying Oppression: South African Foreign Policy toward 
Zimbabwe under Mbeki in R. Southall (ed). South Africa’s role in Conflict Resolution & Peace-
making in Africa. Capetown: HBRC Press. 
Muzondidya, J. (2009) From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980-1997. In B. Raftopoulos & A. Mlambo 
(Eds.), Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, (pp. 167-200). 
Harare: Weaver Press. 
 
Mitchell, L. (1990) The Rudd Concession 1988: The life of the high Honorable Cecil John Rhodes. 
London: Edward Arnold. 
Maroleng, C. (2005) Zimbabwe: Increased securitization of the state situation report. Pretoria: 
Institute of Security Studies. 
Mottier, V. (2008) Eugenics, Politics and the state: Social Democracy and the Swiss 'gardening 
state'. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 39 (2) p.263-269. 
Moyo, S. (2001) The Land Occupation Movement and Democratisation in Zimbabwe: 
Contradictions of Neoliberalism. Millennium- Journal of International Studies. 30 (2) p.311-330. 
Moss, T & Patrick, S. (2005) The Day After Comrade Bob: Applying Post-Conflict Recovery 
Lessons to Zimbabwe. Working Paper 72: Center for Global Development. 
Moore, D. (2005) Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, and Power in Zimbabwe. London: Duke 
University Press. 
Matyszak , D. (2009) Power Dynamics in Zimbabwe’s Inclusive Government. Zimbabwe: 
Research and Advocacy University.  
Moyo, G & Ashurst , M. (2007) The Day after Mugabe: Prospects for change in Zimbabwe. 
London: African Research Institute. 
Moyo, D. (2010) Alternative Media, Diaspora and the Mediation of the Zimbabwe Crisis. Ecquid 
Novi. African Journalism. 28 (1-2) p.81-105. 
124 
 
Nathan, L. (2005) Consistency & Inconsistencies in South African Foreign Policy. International 
Affairs. 81 (2) p.361-372. 
Neuendorf, K. (2002) The content analysis guidebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Ngok, M. (2011) Value Changes and Legitimacy Crisis in Post-industrial Hong Kong: Asian 
Survey. University of California Press. 51 (4) p.683-712.  
 
Ndlovu, C. (2012) Zim Govt steps up anti-sanctions drive. Bulawayo24. [Online] 12 February. 
Available from: http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-12477-article-
Zim+Govt+steps+up+anti-sanctions+drive.html . [Accessed: 3 November 2013]. 
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2009) Do ‘Zimbabweans’ Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National 
Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State. Oxford: Peter Lang AG International  
Academic Publishers 
 
Nwabuzor, A. (2005) Corruption and Development: New Initiatives in Economic Openness and 
Strenghtened Rule of Law. Journal of Business Ethics. 59  (1-2) p.121-138. 
 
Nkomo, J. (1984) The Story of my life, Methuen, London, 1984, p 198. See also PF’s opening 
address at the Constitutional Conference held at Lancaster House, London, September–
December 1979. 
Panitch, L. (2002) “Violence as a Tool of Order and Change: The War on Terrorism and the Anti-
globalisation Movement”.  54 (2) [Online] 12 February. Available from: 
http://monthlyreview.org/2002/06/01/violence-as-a-tool-of-order-and-change.  [Accessed: 7 
July 2013]. 
 
Phimister, I. (1988) An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, Capital Accumulation and 
Class Struggle, 1890-1948. The Journal of African History. 32 (1) p.157-159. 
125 
 
Paus, E.A. (1994) Economic Growth through Neoliberal Restructuring? Insights from the Chilean 
Experience. The Journal of Developing Areas. 29 (1) p. 31-56. 
 
Ploch, L. (2010) Africa Command: U. S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U. S. Military in 
Africa. Congressional Research Services: Diane Publishing. 
  
Rose, R and Shin, D. (2001) “Democratisation Backwards: The Problem of Third Wave 
Democracies”. British Journal of Political Science. 31 (2) p.333–54. 
 
Raftopoulos, B. (2010) The Global Political Agreement as a Passive Revolution: Notes on 
Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe. The Round Table. 99, 411, 2010, pp. 705–718. 
Raftopoulos, B. (2009) ‘The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008’. In Raftopoulos, B., and Mlambo, A., 
(eds) Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008. Harare: Weaver 
Press. 
Radu, W.S. (2011) Zimbabwe in the media: the coverage of the talks about the Zimbabwean 
Unity Government in the Mail & Guardian, 2007-2009. University of Witwatersrand. 
 
Rupiva, M. (2002) Eight Years of Tension, Misperception and Dependence from April 1994 to 
December 2001 Zimbabwe – South Africa Foreign Relations: Zimbabwean Perspectives.Turkish 
Journal of International Relations. 1 (4) p.343- 556. 
Ranger, T. (2004) Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The 
struggle over the past in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies.  30 (2) p.215-234.  
Ranger, T. (2007) City Versus State in Zimbabwe: Colonial Antecedents of the Current Crisis. 
Journal of Eastern African Studies. 1 (2) p.161-192. 
Shaw, R. (2009) Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone. 
United States Institute of Peace Special Report. 
Saunders, R. (2010) Zimbabwe Liberation nationalism old and born again. Review of African 
Political Economy. 38 (1) p.117-128. 
126 
 
Simon, D. (1998) South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the region. Cape Town. Janice 
Curry Ltd 
Smith, R. (2005) Fear, Terror and the spoils of power – youth militias in Zimbabwe’, Ceasefire 
Anti-war News, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. [Online] Available  from: 
http://www.csvr.org.za/articles/artsmit2.htm . [Accessed: 15 February 2014]. 
Smith, D. (2013) Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe Elections win challenged in court, The Guardian. 9 
August. [Online] Available  from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/robert-
mugabe-election-win-zimbabwe . [Accessed: 15  November 2013]. 
Stiff, P. (2000) Cry Zimbabwe: Independence on Fifth Brigade Operational War of  Gurakuhundi: 
Genocide and crimes against humanity. Alberton: Galago Publishing 
Stedman, S. (2001) Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and 
Recommendations for Policymakers. New York: International Peace Academy. 
Stewart, F. (2001) War and Underdevelopment: New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sandelowski, M. (1993) Rigor or rigor mortis: the problem of rigor in qualitative research 
revisited. Advances in Nursing Science. 16 (2) p.1–8. 
 
 
Skaaning, S. (2010) Measuring the Rule of Law. Political Research Quarterly. 63 (2) p.449-460. 
 
Traniello, M. (2008) Power-Sharing: Lessons from South Africa and Rwanda. International Public 
Policy Review.  3 (2) p.28-43. 
Theidon, K. (2009) Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia. Human Rights Quarterly. 31 (1) p.1–34. 
 
The Sunday Mail Newspaper.  [Online] Available from: www.sundaymail.co.zw 
 
The Standard Newspaper.  [Online] Available from: www.thestandard.co.zw 
 




Tibaijuka, A. (2005) Report of the fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and 
impact of Operation Murambatsvina. United Nations. 
 





















Appendix 1. List of Government Appointments under Zimbabwe’s new 
Inclusive  Government  as stipulated in the GPA 
 
                                                                     Executive Positions 
Position  Name Party 
President Robert Mugabe  Zanu-PF 
Vice President Joyce Mujuru Zanu-PF 
Vice President John Nkomo Zanu-PF 
Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai MDC-T 
Deputy Prime Minister Thokozani Khupe MDC-T 
Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara MDC-M 
                                                                     Ministers of State 
Position Name Party 
President’s Office (Healing 
Organ) 
John Nkomo Zanu-PF 
Vice President’s  Mujuru’s Office Sylvester Nguni Zanu-PF 
National Security in President’s 
Office 
Sydney Sekeramayi Zanu-PF 
Security Minister in Presidents 
Office 
Didymus Mutasa Zanu-PF 
Prime Minister’s Office (Healing 
Organ) 
Sekai Hollad MDC-T 
Prime Minister’s Office Jameson Timba MDC-T 
Deputy Prime Minister’s Office 







                                                                             Ministers 
Position Name Party 
Defense Emerson Mnagagwa Zanu-PF 
Local Government & Urban 
Development 
Ignatius Chombo Zanu-PF 
Justice & Legal Affairs Patrick Chinamasa Zanu-PF 
Environment Francis Nhema Zanu-PF 
Tourism Walter Mzembi Zanu-PF 
Transport  & Infrastructural 
Development 
Nicholas Goche Zanu-PF 
Mining & Mining Development  Obert Mpofu Zanu-PF 
Foreign Affairs  Simbarashe Mumbengewi Zanu-PF 
Media, Information & Publicity  Webster Kotiwa Zanu-PF 
Lands & Land Resettlement Herbert Murewa Zanu-PF 
Higher & Tertiary Education Stan Mudenge Zanu-PF 
Women’s Affairs, Gender & 
Community Development 
Olivia Muchena Zanu-PF 
Youth Development, 
Indigenization & Empowerment 
Saviour Kasukuwere Zanu-PF 
Home Affairs  Keibo Mohadi Zanu-PF 
Finance Tendai Biti MDC-T 
Information & Communication 
Technology 
Nelson Chamisa MDC-T 
Science & Technology Heneri Dzinotyiwei MDCT-T 
Public Service Elphas Mukonoweshuro MDC-T 
Energy & Power Development Elton Mangoma MDC-T 
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Constitutional & Parliamentary 
Affairs 
Eric Matienga MDCT-T 
Labour Pauline Mpariwa MDC-T 
Water Resources Joel Gabuza MDC-T 
Health Henry Madzorera MDCT-T 
State Enterprise Gorden Moyo MDC-T 
National Housing & Social 
Amenities 
Giles Mutsekwa MDC-T 
Economic Planning & 
Development 
Tapiwa Mashakada MDCT-T 
Public Works Joel Gabuza MDCT-T 
Home Affairs Theresa Makone MDC-T 
Education, Sports & Culture David Coltart MDC-M 
Industry & Commerce Welshman Ncube MDC-M 
Regional Integration & 
International Cooperation  
Priscilla Mushonga MDC-M 
                                                                        Deputy Ministers 
Position Name Party 
Health & Child Welfare Tendai Mombeshora Zanu-PF 
Labour & Social Welfare Tracy Mutinhiri Zanu-PF 
Education, Sports, Arts & Culture Lazarus Dokora Zanu-PF 
Economic Planning & 
Development 
Samuel Undege Zanu-PF 
Energy & Power Development Hubert Nyanhongo Zanu-PF 
State Enterprises & Parastatal  Walter Chidhkwa Zanu-PF 
Industry & Commerce Micheal Bumha Zanu-PF 
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Regional Integration & 
International Co-operation 
Reuben Marumhoko Zanu-PF 
Public Works Aguy Georgias Zanu-PF 
Public  Service Andrew Langa Zanu-PF 
Foreign Affairs Moses Ndlovu MDC-M 
Higher & Tertiary Education  Lutho Tapela MDC-T 
Local Government, Urban & 
Rural Development  
Tichaona Mudzingwa MDC-T 
Media, Information & Publicity  Murisi Zvizvai MDC-T 
Youth Development, 
Indigenization & Empowerment 
Tongai Matatu MDC-T 
Women’s Affairs, Gender & 
Community Development  
Jessie Majome MDC-T 
 
 
Appendix 2.  Example of a Monthly Coding Scheme with frequency of 
categories for a hypothesized Newspaper 
Political situation variables: 
newspaper reports (theme 
categories 
Frequency of incidents : Monthly for each year 2009 Total 
 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC  
1) Riots 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2) Strikes  0 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 1 2 0 0 8 
3) Human rights abuses  1 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 12 
4) Political violence 1 1 1 4 3 5 0 3 2 0 0 1 21 
5) Atrocities against children 
& minors 
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 2 1 3 0 11 
6) Repressive laws  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
7) Unconstitutional 
appointments 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
8) Threats of strikes & 
protests 





9) Corruption  1 4 5 5 1 8 1 2 3 2 1 2 35 
10) Abduction  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
11) Use of police 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12) Use of military 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13) Bad Mouthing  0 0 1 1 3 5 3 0 2 2 0 1 17 
14) Atrocities against 
women 
0 3 0 1 3 2 1 2 4 0 0 0 16 
15) Plots & assassinations 
and ousting of Political elites 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16) Cash crisis 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
17) Socio-economic 
incidents  
1 5 5 10 4 1 4 0 0 6 1 0 37 
18) Heckling  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
19) Victimization of media 
agents 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 
20) Public arrests 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
21) Land seizures 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 
22) Party instability Zanu-PF 
(arrests, dismissals of party 
members) 
1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
23) Party instability MDC 
(arrests, dismissals of party 
members) 
0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
24) Tourism crisis 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
25) Negative comments 
towards government or 
Zimbabwean situation by 
external sources 




1 8 12 9 5 5 5 4 1 7 0 4 61 
27) Government diplomacy 
initiative, meetings  
0 1 0 1 0 4 3 2 0 0 1 0 12 
28) Government business 
international ventures  
0 0 0 0 3 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 8 
29) Formation of NGO, 
union, civil society or activist 
group 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
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30) Formation of new 
political party 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
31) Formation of new media 
outlet newspaper/radio 
 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 




0 1 0 1 3 4 2 5 10 0 0 0 26 
33) Court trumps against 
government 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34) Sanctions or 
international fallout 
0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
35) Talk of 
Gurakuhundi/Matabeleland 
atrocities 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
36) Pay hikes 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
37) Zanu-PF & MDC talks 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
38) Trade Union instability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39) Donation from other 
state governments 
0 0 0 0 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
40) Other states diplomatic 
initiatives towards 
Zimbabwe 
1 1 6 0 3 1 3 1 5 1 3 4 29 
41) Deaths politically 
motivated  
0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 
42) Politically motivated 
arrests 
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
43) Instability 
chaos/sabotage/squabble 
outrage  in IG 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 
44) Zimbabwe situation 
described as crisis/deadlock 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
45) IG gets approval 0 0 0 0 2 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 7 
46) IG blasting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
47) Inflation drop 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
48) Instability of MDC-T 1 1 0 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
49) Instability of MDC-M 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
50) Improvement of socio-
economic  situation 




Appendix 3. Overall results by frequency for all three newspapers 
Political situation variables: 
newspaper reports (theme 
categories 
Frequency of incidents :  Yearly Comparisons 






Total Rank in 
frequency 
Scale 
1) Riots 0 7 11 18 39* Infrequent 
2) Strikes  12 79 26 117 13 Very Frequent 
3)Human rights abuses  42 227 35 304 2 Very Frequent 
4)Political violence 34 225 22 281 3 Very Frequent 
5) Atrocities against children & 
minors 
0 4 1 5 48 Hardly Any 
6) Repressive laws (includes 
arrests made under this bill) 
12 38 8 58 20 Very Frequent 
7) Unconstitutional 
appointments 
8 42 15 65 19 Very frequent 
8)Threats of strikes & protests  
 
3 35 10 48 25* Very Frequent 
9) Corruption  50 186 44 280 4 Very Frequent 
10) Abductions 2 53 1 56 21 Very Frequent 
11) Use of police 7 60 1 68 17* Very Frequent 
12) Use of military  6 64 19 89 15 Very Frequent 
13) Bad Mouthing amongst 
politicians 
16 134 42 192 6 Very Frequent 
14) Atrocities against women 5 25 0 30 34 Sometimes 
15) Plots & assassinations and 
ousting of Political elites 
2 25 5 32 32* Frequent 
16) Cash crisis 34 78 12 124 12 Very Frequent 
17) Socio-economic incidents  117 573 188 878 1 Very Frequent 
18) Heckling (political 
interference) 
6 27 1 34 30 Frequent 
19) Victimization of media 
agents 
15 86 4 105 14 Very Frequent 
20) Public arrests 0 9 1 10 46 Hardly 
21) Land seizures 14 59 4 77 16 Very frequent 
22) Party instability Zanu-PF 
(arrests, dismissals of party 
members) 
22 152 13 187 7 Very Frequent 
23) Party instability MDC 
(arrests, dismissals of party 
members) 
14 49 5 68 17* Very Frequent 
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24) Tourism crisis 4 37 7 48 25* Very Frequent 
25) Negative comment towards 
government or Zimbabwean 
situation by external sources 
27 129 92 248  
5 
Very frequent 
26) Government development 
initiatives/projects 
19 75 49 143 10 Very Frequent 
27) Government diplomatic 
initiatives 
6 33 15 54 22 Very Frequent 
28) Government business  and 
international ventures 0 
6 2 8 47 Hardly Any 
29) Formation of NGO, union, 
civil society or activist group 2 
2 0 4 49 Hardly Any 
30) Formation of new political 
party 2 
7 4 13 43* Infrequent 




5 30 38 29 Frequent 




40 7 53 23 Very Frequent 
33) Court trumps against 
government 2 
23 8 33 31 Very Frequent 
34) Sanctions or international 
fallout 12 
27 10 49 24 Very Frequent 




17 2 26 36 Sometimes 
36) Pay hikes 
1 
16 3 20 38 Infrequent 
37) Zanu-PF & MDC talks 
3 
19 5 27 35 Infrequent 
38) Trade Union instability 
0 
1 1 2 50 Hardly Any 
39) Donations from other state 
governments 
2 
19 22 43 28 
 
Very Frequent 
40) Other states diplomatic 
initiatives towards Zimbabwe 17 
22 9 48 25* Very frequent 
41) Politically motivated deaths 
(NB deaths had to be counted 
in each report because some 
deaths did not make headlines) 
 
5 
13 4 22 37* Sometimes 
42) Politically motivated arrests 
11 





outrage  in IG 
29 
72 54 155 9 Very Frequent 
44) Zimbabwe situation 
described as crisis/deadlock 60 
100 23 183 8 Very frequent 
45) IG gets approval 
3 
13 6 22 37*  
 
Sometimes 
46) Negative Comments 
towards the IG 2 
13 0 15 42 Infrequent 
47) inflation drop 
0 
1 10 11 45 Infrequent 
48) instability of MDC-T 
2 
5 6 13 43* Infrequent 
49) instability of MDC-M 
5 
3 9 17 40 Infrequent 
50) improvement of socio-
economic  situation 13 
23 95 131 11 Very Frequent 
*- indicates that two or more categories shared the same rank number 
 
Appendix 4. The Socio-economic cluster – The M&G   
The Socio-economic cluster – The Mail & Guardian 
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1) Riots 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2) Strikes  2 3 0 2 0 2 3 
8) Threats of 
strikes & protests  
 









0 0 0 0 2 5 6 
36) Pay hikes 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
16) Cash crisis 7 9 6 8 3 1 0 
11) Use of police 0 2 4 0 0 1 0 
12) Use of 
military  
1 2 0 1 0 0 2 
24) Tourism crisis 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 
29) Formation of 
NGO, union, civil 
society or activist 
group 









0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Appendix  5. The Socio-economic cluster – The Standard News 
The Socio-economic cluster -  The Standard News 
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1) Riots 2 0 0 4 1 0 4 
2) Strikes  6 6 9 4 5 2 6 














1 3 1 0 2 12 4 
36) Pay hikes 0 0 0 3 2 1 1 
16) Cash 
crisis 
27 12 15 14 13 3 1 
11) Use of 
police 
5 8 22 10 8 1 10 
12) Use of 
military  
12 13 4 18 6 1 6 
24) Tourism 
crisis 





















Appendix 6. The Socio-economic cluster – The Sunday Mail 
The Socio-Economic Cluster – The Sunday Mail 
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1) Riots     1 0 0 
2) Strikes      5 9 10 
8)Threats of 
strikes & protests  
 









    14 7 74 
16) Cash crisis     4 7 1 
11) Use of police     1 0 0 
12) Use of 
military  
    0 1 0 
24) Tourism crisis     1 3 3 
29) Formation of 
NGO, union, civil 
society or activist 
group 
    0 0 2 
14) Atrocities 
against women 
    0 0 16 
5) Atrocities 
against children & 
minors 












Appendix 7. The Rule of Law Cluster – The M&G 
  The Rule of Law Cluster    -        The Mail & Guardian 
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
3) Human rights 
abuses  
10 3 7 11 3 3 5 
4) Political violence 0 4 10 8 6 3 3 
6) Repressive laws  1 0 4 4 1 1 1 
19) Victimization of 
media agents 
4 1 2 1 1 4 2 
20) Public arrests 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21) Land seizures 1 4 2 0 3 1 3 
33) Court trumps 
against government 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
34) Sanctions or 
international fallout 
1 5 0 2 2 2 0 




0 0 0 4 0 3 0 
 
 
Appendix  8.The Rule of Law Cluster – The Standard News 
The Rule of Law Cluster  - The Standard Newspaper 
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
        
3) Human rights 
abuses  
39 43 29 45 44 7 36 
4) Political 
violence 
34 18 25 62 36 14 28 
6) Repressive 
laws  




17 11 19 27 8 2 9 
20) Public 
arrests 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21) Land 
seizures 




1 1 4 6 7 1 3 
34) Sanctions or 
international 
fallout 
0 1 4 8 4 7 0 




0 4 4 3 2 4 10 
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Appendix 9. The Rule of Law cluster - The Sunday Mail 
The Rule of Law Cluster – The Sunday Mail 
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
2) Strikes      5 9 10 
3) Human rights 
abuses  
    12 3 12 
4) Political 
violence 









    3 1 1 
20) Public 
arrests 
    0 0 0 
21) Land 
seizures 




    1 3 0 
34) Sanctions or 
international 
fallout 
    4 6 4 




    0 1 0 
 
 
Appendix 10. Legitimacy of the Government – The M&G 
Legitimacy of the Government Clusters - The Mail & Guardian 
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
9) Corruption  11 8 2 3 5 7 4 
25) Negative comment towards 
government or Zimbabwean 
situation by external 
10 2 3 0 5 2 5 
26) Government development 
initiatives/projects 
0 1 1 2 2 6 7 
27) Government diplomatic 
initiatives 
2 1 1 2 0 0 0 
28) Government business 
international ventures  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39) Donation from other state 
govts 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
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40) Other states diplomatic 
initiatives towards Zimbabwe 
8 2 0 2 2 2 1 
43) Instability 
chaos/sabotage/squabble 
outrage  in IG 
0 0 0 3 12 7 7 
44) Zimbabwe situation 
described as crisis/deadlock 
8 3 15 22 6 2 4 
45) IG gets approval 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
46) negative comment towards 
the IG 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
15) Plots & assassinations and 
ousting of Political elites 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
7) Unconstitutional 
appointments 
4 1 1 0 0 0 2 
37) Zanu-PF & MDC talks 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
 
 
Appendix 11. Legitimacy of the Government Clusters – The Standard News 
Legitimacy of the Government Clusters – Standard Newspaper 
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
9) Corruption  33 0 30 45 24 28 38 
25) Negative comment 
towards government or 
Zimbabwean situation by 
external 




24 7 3 3 19 19 23 
27) Government 
diplomatic initiative 
3 2 1 1 1 2 1 
28) Government business 
international ventures  
2 1 0 0 0 2 0 
39) Donation from other 
state govts 
1 2 1 3 12 0 3 
40) Other states 
diplomatic initiatives 
towards Zimbabwe 
0 2 2 9 0 6 2 
43) Instability 
chaos/sabotage/squabble 
outrage  in IG 
0 0 0 9 366 24 14 
44) Zimbabwe situation 
described as 
crisis/deadlock 
6 1 12 32 18 17 6 
45) IG gets approval 0 0 0 0 4 3 3 
46) Negative comment 
towards the IG 
0 0 0 0 6 4 0 
15) Plots & assassinations 
and ousting of Political 
elites 





6 1 2 11 10 6 3 
37) Zanu-PF & MDC talks 0 0 4 9 0 5 0 
 
 
Appendix 12. Legitimacy of the Government clusters – The Sunday Mail 
Legitimacy of the Government Clusters – Sunday Mail 
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
9) Corruption      15 28 39 
25) Negative comment 
towards government or 
Zimbabwean situation by 
external 




    17 20 84 
27) Government 
diplomatic initiatives 
    2 5 12 
28) Government business 
international ventures  
    0 0 8 
39) Donation from other 
state govts 
    0 0 0 
40) Other states 
diplomatic initiatives 
towards Zimbabwe 
    2 5 22 
43) Instability 
chaos/sabotage/squabble 
outrage  in IG 
    20 31 6 
44) Zimbabwe situation 
described as 
crisis/deadlock 
    5 15 3 
45) IG gets approval     3 3 3 
46) Negative comment 
towards the IG 
    0 0 0 
15) Plots & assassinations 
and ousting of Political 
elites 
    2 2 0 
7) Unconstitutional 
appointments 
    2 6 1 
37) Zanu-PF & MDC talks     3 3 1 
 
 
